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1 Introduction 
1.1 The Problem 
Following the incident 11 September 2001, the United States claimed to act in 
self-defence in Afghanistan. One condition of self-defence will be analysed in the 
thesis, namely whether there was an “armed attack” 11 September 2001 pursuant to the 
UN Charter Art 51. The focus will be on who have the legal capacity to carry out such 
an attack, and under which circumstances. 
 
The incident 11 September 2001 (hereinafter “the 11 September incident”) is possibly 
the result of a so-called asymmetric threat. There may be several aspects of asymmetry, 
but for the purpose of the thesis, the interesting part is the state element, or lack of such, 
since the author is a non-state actor, identified as Al Qaida. The term “non-state actor” 
is given a broad meaning, so that it covers any group of individuals that lacks legal 
personality unless it acts on behalf of a state.1 This potential asymmetry challenges the 
condition of armed attack. 
 
In the analysis of this aspect of armed attack, a distinction ought to be drawn between 
conduct by a state and conduct from a state.2 Conduct by a state qualifies undoubtedly 
as armed attack,3 whereas this is less clear regarding from a state, even where a state 
supports the actual conduct. In legal theory this aspect of armed attack is not always 
clearly dealt with,4 if it is dealt with at all. A useful point of departure is provided by 
Cassese (1989),5 who presents six categories to describe different relationships between 
                                                 
1 Compare the definition by the ILC in its Report (2001, p. 109). 
2 Compare Dinstein (2001, p. 192). 
3 But only if the scale and effect are sufficient and if the conduct is directed against a state (compare 
section 1.1.1). 
4 Compare Ulfstein (2003, p. 159, with further references in note 18). 
5 Pp. 597-600. 
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states and non-state actors, with the purpose of defining armed attack. Two categories 
relate to conduct by state officials or de facto state agents, in other words conduct by a 
state. The remaining four categories are relevant for conduct merely from a state: Three 
categories relate to different forms of support to non-state actors, both active and 
passive support, which constitute a “grey zone” of armed attack, whereas the latter 
category includes situations of no state support at all. 
 
There are hence two major problems to be discussed in the thesis, firstly whether the 
11 September incident is conduct on behalf of Afghanistan, hence being an armed 
attack. Provided there is no such state conduct, the problem arises whether any form of 
support, active or passive, by Afghanistan to Al Qaida implicates an armed attack 
11 September 2001. Although the discussion will be closely connected to Afghanistan, 
Al Qaida and 11 September 2001, the intention is also to present a more general 
phramework on who have the legal capacity to carry out an armed attack, and under 
which circumstances. But the 11 September incident is the clear point of departure.  
 
Hence the topic of the thesis is closely connected to the “war against terror” proclaimed 
in the aftermath of 11 September 2001.6 But neither the terms of “war” or “terror” are 
legally significant for the main problem in focus: The so-called war against terror 
should be understood in the same way as a “war against drugs” or a “war against 
poverty”. Under any circumstances, the existence of an armed attack does not depend 
on any situation of war, neither formally or factually.7 Neither are the terms of “terror” 
or similar terms relevant;8 it is the non-state actor element that makes the discussion 
interesting for self-defence, not whether violent incidents constitute “terror acts”.  
1.1.1 Other Aspects of Armed Attack 
The state aspect of armed attack is the main problem discussed in the thesis. Two other 
aspects of armed attack do not create any major problems in relation to the 
11 September incident, namely whether its extent was sufficient and whether it was 
                                                 
6 Cf. e.g. Address to Congress by the President of the United States (20 September 2001). 
7 For the contrary view, cf. Dinstein (2001, pp. 192-213). 
8 With a possible exception for some legal significance in relation to acquiescence based on the Definition 
of Aggression (1974), annexed to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) (1974). 
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directed against the United States as such. A few comments are nevertheless 
appropriate: 
 
As regards the extent of the incident, the prevailing view in legal theory is that use of 
force does not necessarily qualify as armed attack, even if it is prohibited according to 
the prohibition of use of force pursuant to the UN Charter Art 2 (4).9 The term “armed 
attack” does not reveal whether its content differs from “use of force”. Taking into 
consideration Art 2 (4), forming a relevant context for the interpretation of Art 51, an 
assumption is that if low-scale use of force were excluded from armed attack, escalation 
of conflicts could easier be avoided. Such an effect is consistent with Art 2 (4) in the 
seeking of the fundamental purpose of international peace and security of the 
UN Charter. On the other hand, also in such situation there may be a need of self-
defence, and in that sense an exclusion of armed attack could be contrary to the purpose 
of Art 51. 
 
Furthermore, in the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter “the 
ICJ”) stated that the relevant conduct must contain certain “scale and effects”, and 
assumed that e.g. mere border incidents were not covered by the condition of armed 
attack.10 Some reservations ought to be attached to the statement, e.g. it has been 
criticised for being baffling.11 But self-defence was one of the main issues of the 
Nicaragua case, and such a judgement by the ICJ is a forceful argument to conclude 
that not all use of force constitute armed attack.12  
 
Traditionally, one of the problems by applying “armed attack” on so-called terror acts 
has been lack of sufficient scale and effects of the incidents. With the killings of 
                                                 
9 And the prevailing interpretation of Art 2 (4) is that all use of military force between states is prohibited, 
cf. Commentary to the Charter (2002, p. 119). 
10 P. 103, para. 195.  
11 Dinstein (2001, p. 175). 
12 The conclusion is consistent with e.g. Commentary to the Charter (2002, p. 796, compare pp. 790-792), 
stating that “the notion of ‘armed attack’ has a narrower meaning than the phrase ‘use or threat of force’ 
within the meaning of Art. 2 (4)”. 
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approximately 3000 people, coupled with severe economical damage, the 11 September 
incident clearly contains the scale and effects required to be an armed attack.13  
 
The wording of Art 51 requires that the armed attack must be directed against a state, 
and a reasonable interpretation is that the target must be the state as such. With respect 
to the 11 September incident the answer is clear as regards the event related to the 
Pentagon, containing the Department of Defence. It is less clear related to the other 
events. The World Trade Center can however be viewed as a symbol of the financial 
strength of the United States and maybe even as a symbol in general of the United 
States and its powers. In this perspective it is reasonable to interpret all these events of 
11 September 2001 as directed against the United States as such.  
1.1.2 Related Aspects of International Law 
The intention is to focus on an important question of self-defence that particularly 
arises in relation to violent incidents, sometimes characterised as “terror acts”, by non-
state actors, as illustrated by the 11 September incident. Several other questions of self-
defence arise in such situations, but will not be pursued in the thesis: 
 
These include inter alia whether an armed response is a reprisal or self-defence, which 
can also be viewed as a question of the duration of the armed attack. Questions also 
arise whether armed action complies with requirements of customary international law, 
both whether it is necessary and proportionate. In relation to Afghanistan, these 
requirements imply questions of whether the armed action in Afghanistan was the last 
resort, and whether the targeting of the Taleban and the duration of the military 
operation was proportionate.  
 
Moreover, self-defence is the only legal basis for use of force between states under 
discussion. Hence there will be no focus on any possible authorisation by the Security 
Council of the armed operation in Afghanistan pursuant to the UN Charter 
                                                 
13 Ulfstein (2003, pp. 157-158) in the same direction. As regards the factual elements in general, cf. the 
United States Government Report on 11 September 2001 (15 August 2002), and regarding the estimated 
economical damage, cf. Wesbury, Brian S. (2002). 
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Chapter VII,14 nor on other possible legal bases for use of force. And problems related 
to limits for use of force derived from international humanitarian law and international 
criminal law will not be addressed. Neither will there be focus on consequences of 
illegal use of force, including state responsibility and international criminal law. 
1.2 Methodological Questions 
The problems discussed in the thesis arise some particular methodological questions 
that will be presented below. 
1.2.1 Legal Basis 
1.2.1.1 The UN Charter 
The approach of the thesis is to interpret a treaty provision, namely the UN Charter 
Art 51 and its term “armed attack” in particular. The method of international law 
establishes principles on the interpretation of such a treaty provision, and in particular 
the principles of the Vienna Convention Art 31 to 33 are relevant. Truly this convention 
of 1969 has no retroactive effect, but at least its Art 31 is regarded to reflect customary 
international law.15 Expressing the essence of treaty interpretation, it is a fair 
assumption that the content of the customary rule was quite similar in 1945, at the entry 
into force of the UN Charter. Moreover, the general method of international law, partly 
expressed by the Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) Art 38, contains 
relevant principles for the interpretation of the UN Charter Art 51. 
 
The ordinary meaning of the terms of a treaty provision is the important point of 
departure for interpretation in compliance with the principle of the Vienna Convention 
Art 31. The question is whether a more flexible way of interpretation of the UN Charter 
is called for. An argument in legal theory is that being the constitutional document of an 
international organisation, the UN Charter “is being used in order to accomplish the 
stated aims of that organisation”16. In other words, if the interpretation relies too heavily 
on the ordinary meaning of the terms it might hinder the aims of the United Nations 
                                                 
14 This aspect is discussed by e.g. Ulfstein (2001, pp. 154-157). 
15 Shaw (1997, p. 656, with further references in note 117).  
16 Shaw (1997 pp. 658 and 659).  
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being realised. But the argument is dangerous, since the ordinary meaning reflects the 
agreement of the parties to the treaty, containing the reason for emphasising the terms of 
the treaty in their ordinary meaning. A general approach allowing a more flexible 
interpretation of the UN Charter than treaties in general should therefore not be 
accepted. Another issue is that other arguments of interpretation may be so strong that 
the ordinary meaning is not decisive.  
 
Although the question of flexible interpretation is relevant for parts of the thesis, it is 
not decisive in relation to the main problem, namely who can carry out an armed attack, 
and under which circumstances. The term of “armed attack” pursuant to Art 51 does not 
solve that problem, so the question will remain first and foremost on other sources than 
the ordinary meaning of that term. 
1.2.1.2 State Practice 
In general, state practice is a relevant mean for the interpretation of treaties according to 
the Vienna Convention Art 31 (3) (b). Not only the treaties by themselves are a source 
of establishing the will of states, but also state practice may be such a source. Therefore 
it is reasonable to emphasise state practice to interpret treaties. The problem is however 
whether an added emphasis is justified for the purpose of interpreting the UN Charter. 
 
Although factual developments may create needs to change the UN Charter, such 
changes may in practical terms be difficult to make. In their practice states may take 
such factual developments into consideration, which may be important for the 
achievement of the goals of the United Nations. These needs may be higher for treaties 
being constitutional documents than other treaties. On the other hand, to overemphasis 
state practice contains the danger of reducing the value of the ordinary meaning of the 
terms of the treaty, which remain important for treaty interpretation as discussed above. 
Hence it should not be justified with an added emphasis of state practice for the purpose 
of interpretation of the UN Charter and its Art 51.  
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1.2.1.3 General Assembly Resolutions 
There are General Assembly resolutions of interest for the problems discussed in the 
thesis, e.g. the Declaration of Friendly Relations (1970) on the question of acquiescence 
in relation to terror acts abroad. The problem is whether such resolutions are relevant 
for the interpretation of the UN Charter, and which emphasis ought to be attached to 
them. Two main approaches are used in this respect, by either emphasising the practice 
of the treaty organ as such, or as an argument of state practice. 
 
As regards the first approach, it is not clear that practice by a treaty organ such as the 
General Assembly is a relevant source according to the Vienna Convention 
Art 31 (3) (b). The provision requires that the practice establishes “the agreement of the 
parties”, and not merely the will of a treaty organ. This is consistent with the starting 
point of interpretation being the ordinary meaning of the terms of a treaty. Furthermore, 
the resolutions by the General Assembly do not have any legally binding effect,17 and 
the principal judicial body of the United Nations is the International Court of Justice,18 
not the General Assembly. On the other hand, the General Assembly is a body 
constituted by the UN Charter itself, in order to reach the aims of the organisation.19 All 
member states have a right to vote on the resolutions, and consensus resolutions, or 
resolutions with almost consensus, might be close to establish the “agreement of the 
parties” to the UN Charter. In such situations it seems justified not only to use General 
Assembly resolutions for the purpose of interpretation,20 but also with certain emphasis, 
although the emphasis in general should not be exaggerated. 
 
In practical terms the approach contains interest first and foremost in relation to 
resolutions of a general nature, linked to international law. One example is the already 
mentioned Declaration of Friendly Relations (1970),21 which deals with basic principles 
of international law. 
                                                 
17 Except resolutions on inter alia financial matters, cf. the UN Charter Art 17.  
18 The UN Charter Art 92. 
19 Compare Shaw (1997 pp. 658 and 659). 
20 Compare e.g. Ruud and Ulfstein (2002, p. 53).  
21 Compare Brownlie (1998, p. 15, note 86). 
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Since the “agreement of the parties” is the essential argument for that conclusion, such 
resolutions could as well be characterised as sources of state practice, which clearly is a 
relevant source for treaty interpretation. A similar approach was used by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case in relation to the customary prohibition of use of force between states.22 
As an argument to establish that custom, the ICJ emphasised the attitudes of states 
towards the Declaration of Friendly Relations (1970), as expressed by their voting in the 
General Assembly. It is not doubtful that the ICJ would have used a similar approach 
were the basis of the discussion the treaty provision of Art 2 (4). The danger is that the 
approach could undermine the rule that General Assembly resolutions do not have any 
legally binding effect. Nevertheless, the General Assembly is unique in the sense that 
practically all states in the world have a right to speak and vote. Consensus resolutions, 
or resolutions with almost consensus, can therefore be a valuable source of state 
practice. The emphasis ought to be somewhat limited; the approach ought to be done 
with “all due caution”.23  
 
There is a clear similarity between the two approaches above: The impact on the 
interpretation of the UN Charter depends on the attitudes by states towards the 
resolutions, as expressed by their voting in the General Assembly. Therefore there will 
be no further attempts in the thesis to distinguish between these approaches.  
1.2.1.4 Security Council Resolutions 
Furthermore, there are resolutions of interest by the Security Council as well, e.g. on the 
practice of Israel and in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. The problem is whether 
such resolutions are relevant for the interpretation of the UN Charter, and which 
emphasis ought to be attached to them. A distinction will be drawn between the impacts 
as such and in relation to state practice. 
 
As regards the impact by the practice by the treaty organ as such, there are differences 
to the discussion on the practice by the General Assembly. Importantly, far from all 
                                                 
22 Pp. 99-100, para. 188. 
23 Ibid. 
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member states have a right to vote on the Security Council resolutions, hence it is 
difficult to establish any “agreement of the parties” according to the Vienna Convention 
Art 31 (3) (b). On the other hand, the Security Council has the primary responsibility in 
relation to the fundamental purpose of the United Nations of international peace and 
security. Furthermore, its resolutions may contain a legally binding effect. Both 
arguments imply that certain emphasis is justified in relation to the interpretation of the 
UN Charter. E.g. the Security Council made statements on self-defence in its resolutions 
1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, which seem to be 
relevant factors to interpret Art 51.24 
 
Since most states do not vote on Security Council resolutions, the value as source of 
state practice seems decreased compared to the General Assembly resolutions. On the 
other hand, the mere existence of Security Council resolutions on international peace 
and security might be an argument in relation to state practice. A difficult problem of 
state practice is the role of lack of protests by numerous states in face of practice 
followed by some others, and an interesting question is whether Security Council 
resolutions on international peace and security may constitute an appeal for states to 
explicitly protest against such practice to avoid acquiescence in that practice.  
 
The relevance and emphasis of Security Council resolutions will be further addressed in 
chapter 3 (section 3.3.4). 
1.2.1.5 The International Law Commission 
There are also some work of the International Law Commission (hereinafter “the ILC”) 
of interest, in particular its Report on State Responsibility (2001). This work can be 
viewed as legal theory relevant for the purpose of treaty interpretation.25 The problem is 
however whether an added emphasis is justified due to the fact that the ILC is the 
author. 
 
                                                 
24 Compare Ulfstein (2003, p. 157). 
25 On the relevance of legal theory, cf. section 1.2.1.6. 
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One approach is to ask whether the practice by the ILC is practice according to the 
Vienna Convention Art 31 (3) (b). The situation is different compared to the practice of 
the General Assembly and the Security Council: The ILC does not consist of member 
states, but by legal scholars, and it is not a treaty organ of the UN Charter, but an organ 
constituted by the General Assembly.26 Hence it is difficult to establish any “agreement 
between the parties” according to Art 31 (3) (b). 
 
But since the ILC is not only constituted by the General Assembly, but also has a formal 
relationship to it, certain added emphasis may be justified although it does not fulfil the 
requirements of Art 31 (3) (b). Moreover the ILC is a body that consists of broad 
number excellent legal scholars from various member states of the United Nations, 
which factually can lead to high quality reports and statements on legal matters. In 
particular an additional emphasis may be justified as to consensus reports by the ILC. 
Hence the work by the ILC also contains a potential for increased factual emphasis 
compared to the works of legal scholars in general. 
 
For the purpose of the thesis it will be particularly interesting to assess the value of the 
work of the ILC in the field of state responsibility, and to which degree it reflects 
customary international law.27 In this analysis attention must be paid to the fact the 
intention of the ILC is not only to make codifications of customary international law, 
but also to “promote the progressive development of international law”28. Hence it 
should not be taken for given that its work necessarily reflects customary international 
law, but to consider the question in light of the relevant legal material and the view of 
the ILC on the issue itself. 
                                                 
26 The General Assembly resolutions 94 (I) (1947) and 174 (II) (1947), cf. the UN Charter Art 13, no. 1, 
litra a. 
27 Which is clearly a relevant source for the interpretation of the UN Charter Art 51, cf. the principle of 
the Vienna Convention Art 31 (3) (c). 
28 Compare the UN Charter Art 13, no. 1, litra a.  
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1.2.1.6 Legal Theory 
Legal theory is clearly a relevant source for interpretation of the UN Charter Art 51. 
Truly legal theory is not explicitly referred to by the Vienna Convention, but its Art 32 
states that there are “supplementary means of interpretation, including …” (italics 
supplied), a wording that opens for other sources as well. The relevance of legal theory 
is also consistent with the general method of international law and the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (1945) Art 38, no. 4. And legal theory is undoubtedly 
applied by the ICJ and other international tribunals for the purpose of treaty 
interpretation.  
 
However in legal theory the topic of the thesis is not always discussed in much detail. 
Moreover, as pointed out by Ulfstein (2003)29, the question of non-state actors and 
armed attack is not always clearly dealt with in legal theory. Cassese (1989, pp. 597-
600) constitutes an example of a clear presentation, and has influenced the approach of 
the thesis, in addition to in particular the works by Dinstein (2001, pp. 192-221) and 
Ulfstein (2003, pp. 157-161). 
1.2.2 Factual Basis 
Several factual questions arise in the thesis, including who were the perpetrators of the 
11 September incident, whether they were members of Al Qaida, what Al Qaida is, and 
which relationship there was between the Taleban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan. 
 
The main focus of the thesis is not to analyse these factual aspects in details, but clearly 
some information is required. Legal theory contains references, such as Ulfstein (2003) 
and Greenwood (2002), in addition to works by other scholars such as Harpvigen and 
Strand (2001), Hegghammer (2002) and Fouda (2002), and governmental reports, e.g. 
the British Intelligence Report (4 October 2001). There is lack of credible and reliable 
information to some of the questions, and some sound scepticism ought to be attached 
to some of the sources. These problems will be further addressed below. 
                                                 
29 P. 159, with further references in note 18. 
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1.3 Outline 
The distinction between conduct by a state and conduct from a state is reflected by the 
two main chapters of the thesis: 
 
Chapter 2 analyses whether the 11 September incident is conduct on behalf of 
Afghanistan, based on customary rules of state responsibility. The work of the 
International Law Commission may be an important source to establish these customary 
rules. Among other questions arising is whether the incident was controlled by 
Afghanistan and therefore conduct on behalf of that state.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses whether any form of support by Afghanistan, active or passive, to 
Al Qaida implicates an armed attack 11 September 2001. The purpose of self-defence 
forms an important starting point for the discussion, and subsequently active and 
passive support will be respectively analysed. The questions include whether there is 
any “substantial involvement” according to the Definition of Aggression (1974), 
annexed to the General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) (1974), as referred to by the 
ICJ in the Nicaragua case, and which arguments may be deduced from state practice 
and Security Council resolutions, in particular in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. 
 
The main conclusions will be presented in chapter 4. 
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2 Conduct on Behalf of Afghanistan 
The problem is whether the 11 September incident is conduct on behalf of Afghanistan 
and hence also an armed attack pursuant to the UN Charter Art 51, and the approach 
will be to analyse relevant customary rules of state responsibility. Whereas the conduct 
of de jure state organs is the problem of the first section below, the subsequent sections 
will discuss the possibility for de facto conduct on behalf of Afghanistan. 
 
The work of the International Law Commission may be an important point of departure 
to establish the customary rules of state responsibility relevant for conduct on behalf of 
states.30 The ILC has worked in the field of state responsibility since 1949, and its work 
includes extensive studies by five Special Rapporteurs, the first drafting of the articles 
on state responsibility (1980/1996) with the comments by states thereon, and the 
second, final drafting of the articles 9 August 2001.31 The ILC recommends here that 
the General Assembly takes note of the Draft (2001) and annexes the articles to a 
resolution, and that the General Assembly on a later stage consider to held a conference 
for the purpose of concluding a convention on the topic.32 The General Assembly took 
note of the ILC Draft (2001) in its resolution 56/83 (2001). 
 
As outlined in section 1.2.1.5 there are good reasons to emphasis the work of the ILC in 
this field. However to reach firm conclusions, the questions needs to be analysed in 
relation to other legal source, including those referred to by the ILC itself. 
                                                 
30 Customary law is relevant for the interpretation of Art 51 according to the principles of the Vienna 
Convention Art 31 (3) (c). 
31 The ILC Report (2001, pp. 29-32). 
32 Ibid, p. 42. 
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2.1 De Jure State Organ 
In its Draft (2001), the ILC outlines a definition of state organs in Art 4 (1), which 
includes organs that exercise “legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions”. 
The classification of state organs must be based on inter alia internal law according to 
Art 4 (2) which to the view of the ILC also includes the internal practice of the state.33 
 
The problem is firstly whether this provision reflects customary international law. In 
relation to Art 4 (1), the ILC refers to extensive legal material to support the provision,34 
and it is quite convincing in relation to custom. Furthermore, there is hardly any reason 
to doubt that the internal law of the state is a relevant source for the classification of 
state organs according to Art 4 (2). As regards internal practice, in some national 
systems practice is a source of law itself, but even if it is not, a reason to include it is 
convincing: A formal requirement of law can be misleading35 and hence undermine the 
effectiveness of the rules of state responsibility. 
 
The question of whether Al Qaida was a de jure state organ of Afghanistan depends 
inter alia on the content of “internal practice” of the state. Merely a few examples are 
given by the ILC, which mentions other state organs then the cabinet of the state or the 
police where it has a special status.36 Gaja (2001) argues that “a formally independent 
terrorist group could be part of the organization of a state”, with reference to the ILC 
Draft (2001), Art 4 (2). To his opinion, such a group could be covered if e.g. its 
objectives were to fight foreign governments. The author is not explicit on why this is a 
reason to include Al Qaida as a state organ. Truly the objectives and functions can be 
covered by the broad definition of state organs of Art 4 (1). But the problem remains 
whether the non-state actor is founded in the “internal practice” of Afghanistan. 
 
For this problem, it must be clarified which constituted the government of Afghanistan. 
Truly the Northern Alliance still represented the state in the General Assembly of the 
                                                 
33 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
34 Ibid., pp. 84-90. 
35 Ibid., p. 90. 
36 Ibid., pp 90-91. 
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United Nations, and the Taleban was merely recognised by a few states. Nevertheless 
the Taleban controlled approximately 90 % of the territory of Afghanistan. Hence the 
Taleban constituted the government and regime of the state, and the question is whether 
any practice by the Taleban established Al Qaida as a de jure state organ. 
 
The factual relationship between the Taleban and Al Qaida is not clear.37 According to 
the British Intelligence Report (4 October 2001) Al Qaida supported the Taleban regime 
with arms and finances, whereas Al Qaida in return could operate freely on the territory 
controlled by the Taleban. The report does not reveal its source of information, but the 
assumption of lack of interference by the Taleban seems well established.38 It seems 
doubtful whether lack of interference is sufficient to be any “internal practice” by the 
Taleban, all the more since this is hardly consistent with the examples provided by the 
ILC on de jure state organs. 
 
Hence Al Qaida was not a de jure state organ of Afghanistan according to the 
customary international law reflected in the ILC Draft (2001), Art 4.  
 
A problem arises if Al Qaida nevertheless were considered a de jure state organ of 
Afghanistan, namely whether the 11 September incident was conduct by this state 
organ. According to the ILC there is no distinction between “the acts of ‘superior’ and 
‘subordinate’ officials” of the state organ.39 Factually the evidence imply that the 
perpetrators of the 11 September incident had a connection to Al Qaida in 
Afghanistan,40 but were they “subordinates” of the de jure state organ of Al Qaida? The 
structure of Al Qaida is special: It consisted of a hierarchical organisation based in 
Afghanistan, and a “network” in several states.41 The organisation in Afghanistan 
                                                 
37 E.g. Harpvigen and Strand (2001, p. 470).  
38 The lack of action is also reflected by Security Council resolution 1333 (2000), stating a “failure … to 
respond” to the previous Security Council demands of action by the Taleban, in relation to inter alia 
bases. 
39 The ILC Report (2001, p. 87). 
40 Cf. e.g. Fouda, Yosri (2002). 
41 Hegghammer (2002). 
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provided trainings, finances and other support for its network,42 which consisted of both 
individuals (“cells”) and other groups.43 The term of “subordinate officials” is not 
designed for such structures. On the other hand, by accepting Al Qaida as a de jure state 
organ, it also seems difficult to clearly distinguish between the organisation in 
Afghanistan and the part of its network consisting of individuals. Hence it is reasonable 
to view the perpetrators of the 11 September incident as “subordinate officials”. 
 
Hence given that Al Qaida was a de jure state organ of Afghanistan, which the 
organisation was not, the 11 September incident constituted conduct of that organ in 
accordance with the ILC Draft (2001), Art 4.  
2.2 De Facto Control 
A state is not only responsible for conduct by its de jure state organs, but also for 
conduct de facto on its behalf. The main problem to be discussed in this section is 
whether the conduct by Al Qaida was de facto on behalf of Afghanistan, based on de 
facto control by the state of that conduct. Control as a requirement will be analysed in 
light of the work by the ILC, in particular the Draft (2001), Art 8, the Nicaragua case 
by the ICJ and the Tadic case by the ICTY. The ILC Draft also contains terms of 
“direction” and “instruction”, and the implication thereof will be discussed at the end of 
the section. 
 
Quite clearly there exists a customary condition of “control” for the purpose of 
establishing conduct on behalf of a state. Two international judgements are referred to 
by the ILC in this respect: In the Nicaragua case the ICJ applied a condition of 
“effective control”,44 and the ICTY referred to a condition of “overall control”, although 
in another context.45 So the existence of such a requirement is not the controversial 
point to establish conduct on behalf of states. 
 
                                                 
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid. 
44 The Nicaragua case, pp. 64-65, para. 115. 
45 The Tadic case, para. 145. 
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The problem is therefore whether the 11 September incident was controlled by the 
Taleban, which relies on an interpretation of the term of control. Although this is not a 
question of treaty interpretation relying on the principles of the Vienna Convention 
Art 31, the ordinary meaning forms a starting point for the interpretation of the term. 
The New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998) defines the term as “the power to 
influence or direct people’s behaviour or the course of events”.  
 
In its Report (2001), the ILC refers to the Nicaragua case with respect to the 
relationship between the United States and the Contras group within Nicaragua.46 The 
ICJ discussed whether the United States were responsible for alleged violations by 
international humanitarian law and human rights based on conduct by the Contras, 
taking into account support from the United States to the Contras in forms of weapons, 
finances, trainings, logistics and other support. The requirement of “effective control” 
was not met, since the ICJ stated that these forms of participation, even coupled with 
“general control by the respondent State over a force with a high degree of dependency 
on it”, would not suffice.47 Consistent with the Nicaragua case48, the ILC states: 
 
“Such conduct will be attributable to the State only if it directed or controlled the specific 
operation and the conduct … was an integral part of that operation.”49 
 
According to this interpretation, mere influence according to the ordinary meaning of 
the term is not sufficient.50 
 
The Tadic case contrasts the Nicaragua case. Here, the ICTY discussed whether there 
was an international armed conflict so that the international humanitarian law was 
applicable.51 The specific question was whether the conduct of the Bosnian Serb Army 
was controlled by the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
                                                 
46 ILC Report (2001, p. 105). 
47 The Nicaragua case, p. 64, para. 115.  
48 Ibid. 
49 The ILC Report (2001, p. 104), italics supplied. 
50 The ILC Report (2001, p. 164).  
51 The Tadic case, para. 80 and 84. 
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Montenegro).52 According to the ICTY, as regards an “organised and hierarchically 
structured group”53, the relevant requirement is  
 
“overall control going beyond the mere financing and equipping of [armed] forces and involving 
also participation in the planning and supervision of military operations”.54 
 
Contrary to the Nicaragua case, it is not required that “such control should extend to the 
issuance of specific orders or instructions relating to single military actions”55.  
 
The problem is which of these interpretations, “effective” or “overall”, are relevant for 
the content of control. The ILC points out that the discussion by the ICTY relates to the 
application of international humanitarian law, with the final purpose of establishing 
individual criminal responsibility, and that it does not relate to the consideration of state 
responsibility as such.56 In contrast, state responsibility was one of the main questions 
evaluated by the ICJ, constituting an argument in favour of the interpretation presented 
in the Nicaragua case. Moreover a judgement by the ICJ is in general regarded to 
contain more weight then judgements by other international tribunals. A factor is also 
that the ILC shares the view of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case.57 
 
But there are some factors decreasing the weight of the Nicaragua case: It led to no 
consensus judgement. And there could have been more extensive legal analysis of the 
establishment of the effective control test, all the more since there may be difficulties to 
prove the specific control in accordance with the Nicaragua case. These problems of 
proof can, to the view of the ICJ, prevent the effectiveness of the rules of state 
responsibility. On the other hand, a relatively low threshold could lead to abuse of these 
rules. And the factors decreasing the weight of the Nicaragua case should not be 
exaggerated.  
                                                 
52 Ibid., para. 147. 
53 Ibid., para. 120. 
54 Ibid., para. 145, italics in original. 
55 Ibid. 
56 The ILC Report (2001, pp. 106-107). 
57 ILC Report (2001, pp. 106-107). 
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Therefore the interpretation of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case is decisive, so that the 
relevant requirement is “effective” control to establish de facto control and hence also 
conduct on behalf of a state. 
 
As regards the Taleban, there are no clear indications of involvement beyond the lack of 
interference in the conduct by Al Qaida on its territory. Hence there was no effective 
control by the Taleban of Al Qaida in carrying out the 11 September incident, as 
required by the ILC Draft (2001), Art 8 and the Nicaragua case.58  
 
The ILC Draft (2001), Art 8 contains also two other terms potentially relevant to 
establish conduct de facto on behalf of a state, namely de facto “direction” or 
“instructions” of that state. The first problem is whether these terms are consistent with 
customary international law. Instructions as a condition follows according to the ILC 
from international jurisprudence, although the cases referred to were decided before 
1940.59 The condition of direction relates to a passage of the Nicaragua case,60 but with 
less discussion than effective control. There are some doubts, since the firstly 
mentioned cases are old, and since there is lack of legal analysis in the latter case. Such 
conditions may be accepted as customary international law, but the conclusion is far 
from as strong as regarding the effective control test. The problem in focus is however 
whether these requirements contribute anything beyond the condition of control 
discussed above. 
 
It is noteworthy that the ordinary meaning of control referred to previously in section 
included “the power to … direct” (italics supplied) and in that sense is a synonymous 
term to direction. Although the legal content of the condition of control is narrower then 
the ordinary meaning, by requiring it ought to be effective, an essential part of control 
remains an “actual direction of an operative kind” according to the ILC.61 The line 
                                                 
58 Similar conclusion by Ulfstein (2003, p. 160). 
59 The ILC Report (2001, p. 104, cf. note 161). 
60 Ibid, p. 105, cf. note 163. 
61 The ILC Report (2001, p. 164), a passage referred to by the ILC on p. 104, note 160. 
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between the terms of control and direction is therefore ambiguous, if there is any line at 
all. The application of “direction” in the Nicaragua case does not clarify the issue. 
 
Regarding the possible condition of “instructions” it is defined as “direction or order” 
(italics supplied) by to the New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998). It is difficult to 
understand the difference to “direction” in the ordinary meaning of the term of 
instructions. The comments by the ILC hardly clarify the potential difference between 
the terms.  
 
Also to the view of the ILC, a common feature by the three conditions of de facto 
control, direction and instructions is de facto authorisation of the conduct by the non-
state actor.62 But which differences there are between the terms is ambiguous, and the 
attempts to distinguish between them are not fully convincing. Concretely, if a non-state 
actor is either instructed or directed by a state, and carries out the actual conduct, it is 
hardly meaningful that the conduct happens if the state lacks effective control of the 
non-state actor and its conduct.  
 
Hence the key of Art 8 is the condition of “control”, whereas it is doubtful whether 
there are any independent conditions of “instructions” and “direction”. Accordingly the 
conclusion remains that there is no conduct de facto on behalf of Afghanistan based on 
the ILC Draft (2001), Art 8. 
2.3 Adoption and Acknowledgement 
According to the ILC Draft (2001), Art 11 another basis of de facto conduct on behalf is 
adoption and acknowledgement of conduct. This condition is based particularly on the 
view of the ICJ in the Tehran case,63 and where the opinion of the ILC is consistent 
with the ICJ it is a fair assumption that the customary rules of state responsibility are 
reflected.  
 
                                                 
62 Compare the ILC Report (2001, p. 108), stating that “[w]here a State has authorized an act, or has 
exercised direction or control over it, questions can arise as to the State’s responsibility for actions going 
beyond the scope of the authorization.”  
63 ILC Report (2001, p. 120).  
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In the Tehran case, the ICJ discussed whether seizure by militants of the embassy of the 
United States was conduct on behalf of the Iranian state. Based on a decree of the 
Iranian state expressly approving and maintaining the situation, accompanied with 
repeated statements in various contexts, the ICJ identified conduct on behalf of Iran.64 
And according to the ILC mere support or endorsement is insufficient: 
 
“[W]hat is required is something more than a general acknowledgement of a factual situation, but 
rather that the State identifies the conduct in question as its own”.65 
 
The Tehran case was based on statements concretely connected to the conduct under 
question, which seems consistent with the view of the ILC, which states that what is 
required is “clear and unequivocal” acknowledgement and adoption.66 In addition to 
interpretation of words, as in the Tehran case, the ILC assumes that acknowledgement 
and adoption can be inferred from conduct of state organs as well.67 
 
An important question is whether acknowledgement and adoption have retroactive 
effect. The question did not arise in the Tehran case, since the Iranian state acquired 
responsibility upfront the relevant statements based on its failure to take sufficient 
action to prevent the seizure and bring it to an immediate end.68 The ILC states that the 
Draft (2001), Art 11 has retroactive effect69, but it is not clear whether this follows from 
established customary international law.  
 
There are no indications that the Taleban explicitly stated any support at all to the 
11 September incident and under no circumstance any acknowledgement or adoption in 
accordance with the ILC Draft (2001), Art 11. Hence there was no conduct 
11 September 2001 on behalf of Afghanistan on this basis.  
                                                 
64 The Tehran case, p. 35, para. 74. 
65 ILC Report (2001, p. 121), italics supplied. 
66 ILC Report (2001, p. 122). 
67 Ibid. 
68 The Tehran case, pp. 31-33, para. 63-68. 
69 ILC Report (2001, p. 120). 
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2.4 Other Legal Bases 
Other bases of de facto conduct on behalf of a state are presented by the ILC in its 
Draft (2001), Art 9 and 10. Only a few comments are made on the content of these 
potential conditions of customary rules of state responsibility: 
 
As regards Art 9, the problem is whether the 11 September incident was conduct carried 
out in the absence or default of the official authorities of Afghanistan. Several features 
indicate that the provision is not fulfilled: Firstly, it would be required that Al Qaida, 
and its members carrying out the 11 September incident, was “in fact exercising 
elements of the governmental authority”, which seems doubtful. Furthermore, with the 
Taleban as the regime of Afghanistan, there is no “absence or default of the official 
authorities”. Hence the ILC Draft (2001), Art 9 provides not basis for making the 
11 September incident conduct on behalf of Afghanistan. 
 
In relation to Art 10 the question arises whether the 11 September incident was conduct 
by an insurrectional movement and hence being state conduct. There are no indications 
of any conflict between the Taleban and Al Qaida, so neither the ILC Draft (2001), 
Art 10 establishes any conduct on behalf of Afghanistan. 
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3 Conduct from the Territory of Afghanistan 
3.1 The Problem 
Since the 11 September incident was no state conduct as such by Afghanistan, the 
problem arises whether any form of support, active or passive, by Afghanistan to Al 
Qaida implicates an armed attack 11 September 2001. The answer depends on an 
interpretation of the UN Charter Art 51, in accordance with the principles of the Vienna 
Convention, in particular its Art 31. 
 
Art 51 contains no explicit requirement of state conduct to qualify as armed attack, so 
the ordinary meaning seems to open for other conduct as well, e.g. in combination with 
state support short of making the non-state actor a state agent. However the provision 
does not specify who have the legal capacity to carry out an armed attack, so the 
ordinary meaning does not provide any clear answer to the problem.  
3.1.1 Purpose of Self-Defence 
The purpose of self-defence may give guidance to the question. As a tool for 
interpretation purpose is relevant in accordance with the principles of the Vienna 
Convention Art 31. The intention here is to analyse whether state support should be 
included as armed attack, and if so, under which circumstances, in light of the purpose 
of self-defence. In broader terms, the problem is whether such situations of support can 
be so grave that they should open for use of force in self-defence; does any state support 
to non-state actors justify use of force against that state or merely affecting it in an 
action against the non-state actor on its territory? Three aspects of the purpose of self-
defence will be analysed below, namely the interests of the injured state, the interests of 
the supporting state, and the general system of rules governing force. 
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3.1.1.1 The Injured State 
Firstly, regarding the injured state, the key interest is clearly the need of defence of the 
state. Two other aspects of armed attack indicate that such a need existed for the United 
States, namely the extent of the 11 September incident and the fact that it was directed 
against the state as such, as outlined in chapter 1 (section 1.1.1). In this context, it seems 
doubtful whether the need of self-defence is less since no state carried out the potential 
attack, all the more so, if the non-state actor has been supported by a state, which will be 
discussed further below. A need of self-defence in such a situation may also be viewed 
as a reflex of a possibly increased threat of international terrorism. There are current 
features of the international society that may contribute to such a threat, e.g. “rogue” 
states, “failed” states, general globalisation and spread of weapons of mass 
destruction.70 The picture is obviously more complicated to explain causes of 
international terrorism in general, but the very fact that an extensive attack occurs 
within the borders of the only superpower of the world may as such illustrate an 
increased threat of international terrorism.  
 
There may be a reason to distinguish between situations where the non-state actor is 
based on the territory of the supporting state and on the territory of the injured state. In 
the first situation, the only way for the injured state to act against the non-state actor, 
with unilateral use of force, is to rely on self-defence. In the latter situation, self-defence 
is not necessary to use force against the non-state actor. But there are problems with 
such a distinction: The supporting state may be a major problem for the injured state 
although there are no bases on the territory of the supporting state, hence creating a need 
of defence against that state as well. Moreover, it may be difficult to define where the 
non-state actor is based. The distinction also leaves out situations where the non-state 
actor is based in a state that neither is injured nor is supporting, but that is not the 
problem discussed in the thesis. If such a distinction is applicable, Afghanistan clearly 
                                                 
70 Reflected e.g. by the Security Council in the annex to resolution 1456 (2003), pre-amble, para. 3 and 4, 
and the main part, para. 1. 
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falls into the first category, with extensive bases by Al Qaida on the territory and lack of 
interference in its activities as a major problem71 related to defence.  
3.1.1.2 The Supporting State 
In relation to the interests of the supporting state, it would clearly be an advantage with 
no right of self-defence linked to such support. Its interests would be affected by a 
self-defence action, even if merely the non-state actor were the target of the operation. 
Such an effect is serious and would constitute a violation of the fundamental prohibition 
of use of force between states unless the requirements of self-defence are met.72 In cases 
where the state object for self-defence action also has launched the violent action, it is 
clearly justified to establish an armed attack, and the situation would be a “classical” 
conflict between states. There was no such state conduct 11 September 2001, and this 
asymmetrical element brought in by the non-state actor Al Qaida makes it more difficult 
to accept an armed attack opening for force in self-defence affecting a state. 
 
But if there is any state support to the conduct of the non-state actor, the asymmetry 
argument is weakened, and the more serious the support is, the more convincing are the 
reasons to equalise that situation with a situation where the non-state actor is turned into 
a state agent, as discussed in chapter 2. However to measure the seriousness of support 
is a challenge. One factor may be the form of support: Active support may be viewed 
more serious than passive, and it could be assumed that active military support is more 
serious then e.g. financial support. Such a reasoning seems reflected in the overview by 
Cassese (1989), presented in chapter 1 (section 1.1),73 and the form of support may be 
one argument to establish the threshold in this “grey zone” of armed attack. And 
combinations of forms of support should increase the graveness of support. 
Furthermore, the extent of the support should be relevant, since it is hard to see why e.g. 
minor arms transfer under any circumstances should be armed attack. Also the impact 
on the non-state actor could be relevant. This may also be difficult to measure, but a 
standard such as “substantial and direct effect”, as required in international criminal 
                                                 
71 Compare Hegghammer (2002). 
72 Based on the interpretation that Art 2 (4) includes all forms of military force, which is the prevailing 
view in legal theory, compare note 12 above. 
73 Cf. in particular the categories number three to five. 
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law,74 may be relevant. Other factors should neither be excluded, and the question 
would remain on the circumstances of each case. 
 
The seriousness of state support can therefore be described on a scale that depends on 
several factors and the facts of the actual situation. At a certain point at this scale the 
support may be so serious that an armed attack may be acceptable also in light of the 
interests of the supporting state, although the difficult question remains where to 
establish that threshold.  
 
In relation to Afghanistan it is clear that the Taleban did not interfere in the conduct of 
Al Qaida on its territory.75 There are also indications that there were close contact76 
between the Taleban and Al Qaida, but it is not clear whether the Taleban actually 
actively supported Al Qaida. Whether there is any passive support, in forms of 
acquiescence in the base activities by Al Qaida, is a question discussed in section 3.3 
below. At this stage it is worth mentioning that the lack of interference at least was 
significant for the capabilities of Al Qaida: Having its headquarter based on the territory 
of a state constituted a major advantage in relation to its general activities and planning, 
including training of its members and “associates”.77 Hence the impact of such potential 
passive support is an argument in favour of armed attack.  
3.1.1.3 Rules Governing Force 
Self-defence forms part of the rules governing threat or use of force between states, and 
its purpose ought to be interpreted in light of these rules. Firstly the problem is whether 
the prohibition of force expressed by the UN Charter Art 2 (4) implies that self-defence 
must be a clearly limited and not too broad category allowing use of force, and if so, 
whether this influences the question of armed attack in light of support by Afghanistan 
to Al Qaida. 
 
                                                 
74 Cf. e.g. the ICTY statutes Art 7 (1). 
75 Cf. section 2.1. 
76 Ulfstein (2003, p. 160). 
77 Hegghammer (2002). 
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In general, threat or use of force between states is prohibited according to Art 2 (4). This 
main rule intends to minimise use of force, in the seeking of the fundamental purpose of 
the UN Charter of international peace and security. In other words, respect for the 
prohibition could avoid escalation of armed conflicts and contribute to the stability of 
the state system. A broad exception of unilateral force through the provision of self-
defence could undermine the prohibition of force and its effectiveness. The UN Charter 
intends as well to keep self-defence subsidiary to the prohibition and use of force by the 
Security Council according to the mere wording of Art 51. There might be situations 
where there is need of self-defence, but where the interest of the international security 
prevails.78 
 
Therefore Art 2 (4) implies that self-defence should not be construed as a broad 
category, and its limits should be as clear as possible.  
 
To accept armed attack by non-state actors in situations of state support may create 
several problems in this respect. It is not an easy task to clearly limit which situations 
are so grave that they should be covered,79 and inclusion of state support may be open 
for abuse. Having said that, discretionary considerations are important for other 
conditions of armed attack, through the customary principles of necessity and 
proportionality, so a discretionary consideration in relation to armed attack should not 
necessarily be rejected. However the more discretionary consideration included in 
relation to self-defence, the more difficult it will be to limit, with the risk of being a too 
broad category.  
 
These features are problems in relation to the UN Charter Art 2 (4), potentially 
undermining the main rule of use of force. But they may come in another light taking 
into consideration the lack of effective action by the Security Council based on the 
UN Charter Chapter VII. The problem is whether this lack of use of the mandate to 
                                                 
78 Commentary to the Charter (2002, p. 792): “[B]eing caught in the ‘dilemma between security and 
justice’, the UN Charter deliberately gives preference to the former”. 
79 Some concrete examples are given in relation to acquiescence in section (3.3.3.2). 
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authorise use of force implies that self-defence must not necessarily be clearly limited 
or kept as a not too broad category.  
 
It could be dangerous for the survival of states to respect a prohibition of use of force in 
any circumstances except in self-defence. Use of force can be an important and 
necessary tool not only against an armed attack, but also in other situations of instability 
between states, which may constitute a threat for the state system. Therefore the 
UN Charter constitutes the Security Council, provided with the competence to authorise 
use of force in certain situations of international instability pursuant to the UN Charter 
Chapter VII Art 42, cf. Art 39. The possibility to authorise does however not correspond 
with the actual practice by the Security Council, which is criticised on numerous 
occasions for lack of effective action, in particular before 1990.80 
 
An assumption is that this lack of effective action could legitimise that Art 51 not 
necessarily ought to be a clearly limited and not too broad category. However the 
UN Charter is designed in such a way that certain lack of effectiveness ought to be 
anticipated. The veto right has been an important factor in this respect. Although its use 
has been somewhat higher then expected, it could hardly have been impossible to 
forecast lack of action in some situations. On the contrary, the reason to include the veto 
right was to give a possibility to some of the most powerful states at the time an 
opportunity to hinder actions against their interests. 
 
Therefore, it would not be true to state that the prohibition of use of force relies on the 
effective action by the Security Council to use force when needed. But it weakens the 
impact of the prohibition of use of force on the interpretation of Art 51, at least as 
regards state support in relation to non-state actor conduct, being a grey zone of armed 
attack and self-defence.  
                                                 
80 E.g. dissenting opinion of Judge Jennings in the Nicaragua case, pp. 543-544.  
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3.1.1.4 Conclusion 
A conclusion deduced of the purpose of self-defence is difficult to establish: Whereas 
the need of the injured state implies armed attack, the interest of the supporting state 
counters that need. But the more support, the weaker the latter argument is. An 
inclusion of even certain forms of support forms may nevertheless undermine the 
fundamental prohibition of use of force between states. The lack of effective action by 
the Security Council weakens the impact of that argument, but the strength of the 
prohibition of use of force may be decisive. A probable conclusion is therefore, in light 
of the purpose of self-defence that an armed attack should not be accepted in face of 
state support to a non-state actor. The conclusion is however not clear, and the weight of 
purpose is somewhat limited.  
 
In the further analysis of state support, non-state actor conduct and armed attack a 
distinction will be drawn between active and passive support. Truly the difference 
between the categories should not be exaggerated, but the different characteristics by a 
commission and omission makes it feasible to make that distinction. The emphasis will 
be on passive support, being mostly relevant for Afghanistan, and also with newer state 
practice, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. 
  
 30 
 
3.2 Active support 
3.2.1 Substantial Involvement 
The problem is whether any active support by the Taleban constituted substantial 
involvement in the sending by Al Qaida of the perpetrators of the 11 September 
incident. 
3.2.1.1 Legal Basis 
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ stated that 
 
”it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be understood as including not 
merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also ‘the sending by or 
on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of 
armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to’ (inter alia) an actual armed 
attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or its substantial involvement therein’. This description, 
contained in Article 3, paragraph (g), of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General 
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), may be taken to reflect customary international law.”81 
(Italics supplied.) 
 
The Definition of Aggression (1974), annexed to General Assembly Resolution 3314 
(XXIX) (1974) was the result of a long process that included the work of a special 
committee for several years. A considerable period of time with negotiations between 
states was required before the resolution could be adopted unanimously by the General 
Assembly. 
 
The stated aim of the Definition of Aggression (1974)82 is to define the term of 
“aggression” pursuant to Art 39, as one of the categories by which the Security Council 
has the capacity to act to maintain or restore international peace and security, including 
by use of force in compliance with Art 42. Since even a “threat to the peace” suffices 
for the Security Council to act, it may seem somewhat peculiar that the question of 
defining aggression was that controversial. But there might be other reasons for the 
                                                 
81 The Nicaragua case, p. 103, para. 195. 
82 Pre-amble, para. 2, compare the resolution, para. 4. 
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controversies, e.g. fear for legal impact on the question of a possible crime of 
aggression, or impact on the right of self-defence, as will be discussed below.  
 
Although the resolution, including its annex, is not binding for the member states of the 
United Nations, it contains interest as a factor of interpretation of the UN Charter, as 
outlined in chapter 1 (section 1.2.1.3). Two arguments strengthen the assumption in 
relation to the Definition of Aggression (1974): All member states voted in favour, and 
there is quite extensive work lying as a fundament of the resolution. Nevertheless due 
caution is required in the use of the document for the purpose of interpretation. 
 
But the relevance is only clear in relation to the UN Charter Art 39, and another 
question is whether the Definition of Aggression (1974), Art 3 (g) is relevant for the 
interpretation of “armed attack” pursuant to the UN Charter Art 51. According to the 
Definition itself, it does not intend to impair rules governing use of force,83 so that a 
definition of “armed attack” is beyond its scope. On the other hand, the ICJ applies the 
document in relation to this condition of self-defence in the Nicaragua case. But the ICJ 
does not argue explicit why “it may considered agreed” that armed attack includes the 
situation of Art 3 (g), and there are no references to state practice in this respect. The 
fact that the ICJ accepts the relevance thereof is however a strong argument for the 
relevance of the Definition of Aggression, Art 3 (g) for interpreting “armed attack”, and 
such relevance is therefore also the conclusion of the discussion here. 
 
Formally the view by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case relates only to the right of self-
defence in customary international law, since the ICJ could not apply self-defence 
pursuant to Art 51 in the actual case.84 However the ICJ considers the content of the 
customary self-defence to be almost identical with Art 51.85 This assumption is 
controversial86, but it reveals that the ICJ would most likely consider the Definition of 
Aggression, Art 3 (g) as relevant also for self-defence in accordance with Art 51.  
                                                 
83 Art 6. 
84 The Nicaragua case, p. 38, para. 56, cf. p. 26, para. 33. 
85 Compare Commentary to the Charter (2002, p. 805, cf. note 164). 
86 Commentary to the Charter (2002, pp. 805-806). 
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3.2.1.2 The Ordinary Meaning 
For the purpose of the thesis, “substantial involvement” is the key notion of the 
Definition of Aggression (1974), Art 3 (g). According to Black’s Law Dictionary 
(1990), “substantial” is equivalent to “[o]f real worth and importance” or “of 
considerable value”. This definition gives however limited guidance, since the problem 
remains which threshold there is to make the involvement to be “of considerable value”.  
 
With respect to “involvement”, the term is quite broad and can probably cover a variety 
of possible support by a state to a non-state actor, both active support such as supply of 
military equipment, finances or logistics and passive support such as acquiescence. The 
interesting question is however when such support is “substantial”. Before analysing 
whether any active support may be substantial, some preliminary points are presented: 
 
There is an overlap between conduct on behalf of states and the requirement of 
“substantial involvement”: Where a state is substantially involved, the state support may 
be so extensive that the non-state actor is turned into a state agent. The problem to be 
discussed below is whether other situations of support, going beyond conduct on behalf 
of states, are covered by “substantial involvement”.  
 
A pre-condition to apply substantial involvement in relation to Afghanistan is that the 
perpetrators of the 11 September incident were sent by Al Qaida in Afghanistan, and 
this question hardly seems doubtful.87 Moreover, the perpetrators must qualify as 
“armed bands…”, which may be more doubtful according to the ordinary meaning of 
the term. However Al Qaida was well structured with military capabilities, and it is 
reasonable to characterise the perpetrators as “armed bands…”. 
3.2.1.3 Application to Afghanistan 
The question is whether any active support by Afghanistan in the conduct of Al Qaida 
on its territory constituted “substantial involvement” according to the Definition of 
Aggression (1974), Art 3 (g). Since active support is clearly “involvement”, the problem 
is whether any such support was “substantial”. 
                                                 
87 Compare Fouda, Yosri (2002).  
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In general, active support by a state may have a considerable impact on the activities by 
a non-state actor on its territory. Extensive support may clearly be “of considerable 
value”, or “substantial”, in this respect. So the ordinary meaning of the term implicates 
that active state support may be “substantial involvement”, although it is not clear 
which threshold there is, i.e. which situations of active support are covered.  
 
During the negotiations leading to the Definition of Aggression (1974), one controversy 
related to the conduct of non-state actors, and one of the contesting proposals included 
as aggression “[o]rganizing, supporting or directing … acts of terrorism in another 
State”.88 In a compromise proposal, leading to the final document, such a category was 
not explicitly included. However another term was instead inserted, namely “substantial 
involvement”. It is not clear whether or to which degree active support was to be 
covered by the term. In an analysis of the history of the Definition of Aggression 
(1974), Judge Schwebel, in his dissenting opinion of the Nicaragua case, indicates that 
the term of “substantial involvement” may cover state support.89 But the question 
remains which situations actually may be covered.  
 
According to the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, certain situations of active support are not 
covered by the UN Charter Art 51. The question was whether there was an armed attack 
by Nicaragua against El Salvador due to the flow of arms passing Nicaraguan territory 
on its way to insurgents in El Salvador. With reference to the Definition of Aggression 
(1974), Art 3 (g), the ICJ expressed that it 
 
“does not believe that the concept of ‘armed attack’ includes … assistance to rebels in the form 
of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support.”90  
 
Even if the sending of the weapons constituted conduct on behalf of Nicaragua, which 
was not proven, there would have been no armed attack by Nicaragua on El Salvador.91 
                                                 
88 Dissenting opinion by Judge Schwebel in the Nicaragua case, p. 341, para. 162. 
89 Ibid, p. 343, para. 165. 
90 The Nicaragua case, pp. 103-104, para. 195. 
91 Ibid., p. 119, para. 230. 
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It is not clear whether the ICJ discussed the condition of substantial involvement or 
sending. If the latter is correct, the judgement is hardly controversial: Art 3 (g) relates to 
sending of people, and not arms. Some more doubts are there in relation to substantial 
involvement, since it is not clear whether the requirement relates to the sending of 
“armed bands…” or to the violent incidents by the non-state actor abroad. The ordinary 
meaning opens for both alternatives, although it is argued in legal theory that only 
involvement in sending suffices.92 The latter assumption is strengthened by the 
Nicaragua case, since arms transfer, a potential involvement in violent incidents by the 
non-state actor abroad, is not accepted as substantial involvement. 
 
In legal theory, the interpretation of substantial involvement by the ICJ has been 
characterised as “restrictive”.93 This may be true as regards support to a non-state actor 
based merely in the injured state, since the ICJ excludes as armed attack almost any 
active support by a state in such situations.94 But the ICJ does not discuss which level of 
support is necessary to be substantially involved in the sending by a non-state actor 
from its own territory, as the Taleban in relation to Al Qaida. Hence the judgement 
leaves open whether active support in such situations, e.g. by arms transfer, may qualify 
as armed attack.  
 
A possible approach is that a restrictive interpretation should also be applied here. 
However the reasons for interpreting “substantial involvement” restrictively in the 
Nicaragua are not clear. One reason could be a fear that the term would provide a too 
broad basis for self-defence, and that a restrictive interpretation could support the 
prohibition of use of force aiming at international peace and security. But since the ICJ 
does not reveal its reasons for restrictive interpretation, it is difficult to argue that 
substantial involvement in general should be interpreted restrictively. 
 
                                                 
92 Zanardi (1986, p. 115). 
93 Ulfstein (2003, p. 160, with further references in note 20). 
94 Compare Gill (1988, p. 52).  
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Therefore there are good reasons to distinguish between situations of involvement in 
sending of non-state actors (“armed bands…”) from own territory and involvement in 
violent incidents abroad.95 In practical terms active support can only in the first situation 
constitute “substantial involvement” pursuant to the Definition of Aggression (1974), 
Art 3 (g). If a state actively supports and is involved in activities by a non-state actor 
that is merely based abroad, e.g. in the injured state, the requirement of substantial 
involvement will not be fulfilled. Another question is that active support may be so 
extensive that the non-state actor is acting on behalf that state, as discussed in chapter 2, 
so that there nevertheless is an armed attack. 
 
Nevertheless it is not clear how much active support a state must provide to be 
substantially involved in the sending of non-state actors from its territory. 
 
In relation to Afghanistan there are however hardly any traces of active support by the 
Taleban to Al Qaida, so there is no substantial involvement on the basis of active 
support.  
 
As to the general conclusion, it must be added that even if the Nicaragua case were 
considered relevant in relation to Afghanistan, the weight of the judgement is 
challenged by criticism by some of the judges in the ICJ itself, namely by the dissenting 
opinions by Judge Jennings and Judge Schwebel. Judge Jennings emphasised the 
possible significances of provision of arms in such cases, in particular “where it is 
coupled with other kinds of involvement”.96 Furthermore, he stated: 
 
“[T]o say that the provision of arms, coupled with ‘logistical or other support’ is not armed 
attack is going much too far.”97 
 
These critical comments have received some support in legal theory.98 Combined with 
lack of extensive legal analysis by the ICJ itself, the weight of the statement of the 
                                                 
95 Gill (1988, p. 40) argues in favour of a similar distinction. 
96 Dissenting opinion by Judge Jennings in the Nicaragua case, p. 543.  
97 Ibid. 
98 E.g. Gill (1988, p. 52). 
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Nicaragua case is weakened. The view of the majority prevails though probably, since 
the Nicaragua case is one of few and important judgements in the field of self-defence 
in international law. 
 
Another question is whether a lack of substantial involvement excludes the option of an 
armed attack in face of active support by a state to non-state actors. In legal theory it is 
argued that the Nicaragua case is exhaustive on this point,99 and therefore that there 
would be no armed attack. Truly, to accept self-defence in such a case would undermine 
the Nicaragua case as regards its effect on limiting the condition of “armed attack”. 
Nevertheless, the question of state support and armed attack is controversial, and it was 
neither brought in for the ICJ nor was it explicitly addressed by it. The lack of 
substantial involvement by Afghanistan, based on potential active support, does 
therefore probably not exclude the possibility of an armed attack provided there was any 
active support by the Taleban to Al Qaida on its territory. 
3.2.2 Use of Force 
 “[A]rmed attack” is a term only used by the UN Charter Art 51 and must not be 
interpreted identically as “use of force” pursuant to Art 2 (4). There is an overlap 
between the terms, but the prevailing view in legal theory is that “armed attack” is the 
narrower notion of the two,100 so which situations of “use of force” are not covered by 
Art 51 may not be clear. Nevertheless the problem will be whether any arguments 
linked to Art 2 (4) are relevant to establish armed attack in face of active state support to 
a non-state actor.  
 
It is not clear whether the ordinary meaning of Art 2 (4) covers such support. But it is 
clear that only use of force “between states” is included, so that violent incidents by 
non-state actors can not be included as such. The problem is whether the role of the 
state, by active support, constitutes use of force. Unlike situations where the state uses 
                                                 
99 Schachter (1993, p. 249). 
100 Commentary to the Charter (2002, pp. 790-792). Hence substantial involvement (section 3.2.1), as 
reflecting armed attack, is clearly covered by use of force as well. 
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force itself, which is partly discussed in chapter 2, Art 2 (4) is less clear and precise as 
to whether such indirect use of force is covered.  
 
Art 2 (4) intends to reduce force between states in the seeking of the fundamental aim of 
the UN Charter of international peace and security. The efficiency of this main rule 
could decrease if state support under no circumstances is included, not even where there 
is extensive active support that is significant for the conduct of the non-state actor. But 
problems arise how to define which support is serious enough to be included, a problem 
already discussed in relation to self-defence (section 3.1.1). Also the main rule of force 
should contain certain predictability for states, which may be reduced by lack of clear 
limitations of the rule. The alternative of including all kinds of state support is neither 
preferable, since a too wide rule compared to its purpose could reduce the respect for 
the prohibition and hence also its efficiency. The purpose of Art 2 (4) therefore slightly 
implicates that state support should be excluded, and that if it nevertheless were 
included, the threshold should be relatively high. 
 
Some light is shed on the problem by the Declaration of Friendly Relations (1970), 
annexed to the General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) (1970):  
 
 “Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in 
acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its 
territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present 
paragraph involve a threat or use of force.”101 (Italics supplied.) 
 
The declaration was the result of a long process that included the work of a special 
committee for several years, and a considerable period of time with negotiations 
between states was required before the resolution could be adopted unanimously by the 
General Assembly. 
 
The aim of the declaration is to specify some of the basic principles of the UN Charter, 
and the cited statement is linked to the prohibition of use of force pursuant to Art 2 (4). 
                                                 
101 No. 1, para. 9. 
  
 38 
 
Although the resolution, including its annex, is not binding for the member states of the 
United Nations, it contains interest as a factor of interpretation of the UN Charter, as 
argued in chapter 1 (section 1.2.1.3). In relation to this particular resolution emphasis 
seems further justified since states have been thoroughly discussing the issues, ending 
with consensus by all the member states, coupled with quite extensive work lying as a 
fundament of the resolution. Nevertheless due caution is required in the use of such a 
document for the purpose of interpretation.  
 
The ordinary meaning of the statement is quite broad, and organisation, instigation, 
assistance and participation may cover numerous situations of state support to a non-
state actor. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ interpreted the terms when it discussed 
whether support by the United States to the Contras in Nicaragua constituted use of 
force.102 Based on the referred statement in the Declaration of Friendly Relations (1970) 
the ICJ identified supply of arms and munitions as use of force, whereas financial 
support was not considered a violation of Art 2 (4).103  
 
With respect to the negative definition, excluding financial support, this may be labelled 
as a restrictive interpretation of the Declaration of Friendly Relations (1970). The 
reasons are not clear, but a possible reason may be a fear of undermining the respect for 
the main rule of prohibition of use of force if its content is stretched too far. The 
ordinary meaning of the declaration, as an expression of state practice, contains weight 
as an argument against the Nicaragua case. On the other hand, the terms are open for 
discretionary consideration, and the view by the ICJ in one of few judgements in the 
field of rules governing force can hardly be ignored.  
 
The problem is then whether financial support also ought to be excluded from the 
condition of “armed attack”. The assumption that armed attack is narrower then use of 
force is first and foremost linked to the requirement of certain scale and effect for an 
incident to be armed attack. It is less clear whether armed attack is narrower regarding 
who have the legal capacity to carry out an armed attack. Hence it is not given that 
                                                 
102 Pp. 118-119, para. 228. 
103 Ibid. 
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armed attack ought to be narrower in this respect, but to say that, on the contrary, that 
armed attack may include financial support, whereas it is not covered by Art 2 (4), 
would probably be going too far.  
 
Therefore a possible conclusion is that active support by a state in form of financial 
support to a non-state actor that carries out violent incidents abroad is not covered by 
armed attack pursuant to Art 51. 
 
However the problem remains which kinds of state support is covered by Art 51, if any 
at all. Truly the view of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case is that transfer of arms and 
munitions is a violation of Art 51, based on the Declaration of Friendly Relations 
(1970). But it remains unanswered whether this is true for armed attack. This is 
supported by the declaration itself, who states that the intention is not to impair other 
rules governing force,104 so that a definition of “armed attack” is beyond its scope. And 
in contrast to the Definition of Aggression (1974), there are no statements by the ICJ 
supporting such relevance for armed attack.  
 
Hence it is not possible to establish which kinds of active state support, if any at all, is 
positively covered by self-defence based on Art 2 (4) as interpreted in the Declaration of 
Friendly Relations (1970).  
 
The question of whether any active support by a state may be armed attack is therefore 
not provided by neither the requirement of “substantial involvement” based on the 
Definition of Aggression (1974), nor based on Art 2 (4). In relation to Afghanistan the 
problem does not arise on the facts, but it contains interests for other cases. However the 
problem will not be further pursued, since the main focus of the thesis is the armed 
action in Afghanistan 2001 and its legality based on self-defence. 
                                                 
104 No. 1, para. 13. 
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3.3 Passive Support 
3.3.1 Substantial Involvement 
The problem is whether any passive support by the Taleban constituted substantial 
involvement in the sending105 by Al Qaida, based on the Definition of Aggression 
(1974), Art 3 (g), as reiterated in the Nicaragua case in relation to armed attack. The 
further discussion must be read in light of the analysis presented in section (3.2.1), inter 
alia in relation to the strength of the legal basis. 
 
Since passive support is clearly an “involvement”, the question is whether any such 
support was “substantial”. As a point of departure, active support may easier be 
covered, but also passive support may be of considerable value: The lack of interference 
by the Taleban, a potential passive support, was important for the capabilities of Al 
Qaida, having the major advantage to operate freely on the territory of Afghanistan.106 If 
there was such passive support, as will be discussed in section 3.3.3, it may be possible 
to characterise the involvement to be “substantial”. However the ordinary meaning of 
the term is not clear on this threshold. 
 
The history of the Definition of Aggression (1974) sheds some light on passive support, 
as with active support discussed above. According to the view of Judge Schwebel, in his 
dissenting opinion of the Nicaragua case, support may be covered by “substantial 
involvement”.107  
 
With respect to the Nicaragua case it is argued above (section 3.2.1) that its negative 
definition of substantial involvement only relates to support to non-state actors in the 
injured state, and this restrictive interpretation lacks relevance to situations where the 
non-state actor is based e.g. on the territory of a passively supporting state. Hence the 
Nicaragua case does not exclude the possibility of acquiescence being covered by 
“substantial involvement”.  
                                                 
105 Cf. section 3.2.1. 
106 Hegghammer (2002). 
107 Cf. section 3.2.1. 
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The conclusion remains open on whether passive support is covered by “substantial 
involvement” pursuant to the Definition of Aggression (1974), Art 3 (g), hence also 
whether the requirement was fulfilled in relation to Afghanistan. As outlined above, 
even if substantial involvement is lacking, there still may be an armed attack according 
to Art 51. 
3.3.2 Use of Force 
The problem is whether any passive state support to a non-state actor may constitute use 
of force in violation of the UN Charter Art 2 (4) and whether such a violation may be 
relevant for Art 51. As outlined above (section 3.2.2) the ordinary meaning is not clear 
in this respect, neither is the purpose of Art 2 (4).  
 
Some guidance is provided by the Declaration of Friendly Relations (1970), stating that 
acquiescence is covered by Art 2 (4). As regards the negative definition by the ICJ in 
the Nicaragua case it relates to active support, and not passive support such as 
acquiescence. The problem is therefore whether this restrictive approach is relevant for 
the consideration of whether use of force covers acquiescence. 
 
The reasons for the ICJ to use a restrictive approach are not clear. But it is clear that 
both questions relate to a quite similar issue, namely whether certain state support ought 
to qualify as use of force. In that sense, the Nicaragua case illustrate that such support is 
not necessarily force, according to the view of the ICJ, even if it is covered by the 
Declaration of Friendly Relations (1970). On the other hand, the Nicaragua case related 
merely to support by a state to a non-state actor in another state. Acquiescence relates to 
the passive support by a state to a non-state actor on its own territory, and it is far from 
clear whether the Nicaragua case gives any guidance to this situation. 
 
So, the negative definition of the Nicaragua case is not relevant in relation to 
acquiescence, and in light of the ordinary meaning of the Declaration of Friendly 
Relations (1970), as a quite strong argument of state practice in the field, acquiescence 
is covered by the UN Charter Art 2 (4). 
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In contrast to active financial support as described above, there is no negative definition 
of acquiescence, excluding it from use of force. Hence it may also be relevant for 
Art 51. But such a positive definition of use of force gives however limited guidance to 
the interpretation of “armed attack”. 
3.3.3 Passive Support as Armed Attack 
The arguments presented so far are not clear as to whether passive support may be 
included as armed attack pursuant to the UN Charter Art 51. Truly the purpose of Art 51 
slightly indicates that it should not be included, but neither the term substantial 
involvement nor use of force provides clear guidance to the question. Nevertheless the 
United States argued that there was an armed attack 11 September 2001, as will be 
further explored in relation to state practice and Security Council resolutions in 
section 3.3.4. This implies an analysis of the following problem: If some forms of 
passive support were to be included, which forms should be armed attack?  
 
The focus of the discussion will be whether there is an international duty to refrain from 
acquiescence, and whether Afghanistan violated such a duty.  
3.3.3.1 Acquiescence by Afghanistan 
There exist relevant particular obligations for Afghanistan pursuant to several Security 
Council resolutions, which will be discussed in section 3.3.3.1.3. The main approach 
will however be to analyse whether Afghanistan violated any general duty of 
international law, so that it may be possible to compare the discussion with other 
incidents as well. 
3.3.3.1.1 Legal Bases 
In section 3.3.2 it is concluded that acquiescence is covered by the prohibition of use of 
force pursuant to the UN Charter Art 2 (4). Here, alternative bases for a duty to refrain 
from acquiescence will be shortly presented. 
 
One problem is whether the Declaration of Friendly Relations (1970) expresses a duty 
of international law, independent of whether it is covered by Art 2 (4) or not. Such an 
assumption is supported by the Declaration of Measures to Eliminate International 
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Terrorism (1994), annexed to the General Assembly resolution 49/60 (1994), which 
contains a quite similar statement as the declaration of 1970,108 hence confirming state 
practice in the field. Security Council resolution 1269 (1999) contains a statement in the 
same direction. A likely conclusion is therefore that international law envisages a duty 
for states to refrain from acquiescence in conduct by non-state actors on their territory 
when the conduct is directed against violent incidents abroad, independent of the 
prohibition of use of force. 
 
Furthermore, a similar duty may be deduced by customary rules for states to avoid 
damage on other states, i.e. to act with due diligence.109 
 
The approach further will be based on acquiescence as use of force. 
3.3.3.1.2 Duty to Prevent 
3.3.3.1.2.1 Point of Departure 
The ordinary meaning of acquiescence should be consulted as a starting point for the 
analysis, although its relevance can not be based on the Vienna Convention Art 31. 
Black’s Law Dictionary (1990) defines acquiescence as “[p]assive compliance or 
satisfaction; distinguished from avowed consent on the one hand, and, on the other, 
from opposition or open discontent”, and as “[c]onduct from which assent may be 
reasonably inferred”. As an example it is mentioned that acquiescence can be “inferred 
from silence”, and a natural understanding is that lack of action by a state can be the 
basis of inference as well. Hence the essence of the term is, in our context, tacit consent 
that can be inferred from lack of action. The problem is however which action is 
required.  
 
                                                 
108 No. 4, stating that “[s]tates … must refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in 
terrorist acts in territories of other States, or from acquiescing in or encouraging activities within their 
territories directed towards the commission of such acts” (italics supplied). 
109 Compare Dinstein (2001, p. 215) and the Corfu Channel case, p. 22 (“… every State’s obligation not 
to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”). 
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According to the Declaration of Friendly Relations (1970) the prohibited acquiescence 
relates to “organized activities … directed towards the commission of [terrorist] acts” 
abroad, and the wording of the Declaration of Measures to Eliminate Terrorism (1994) 
is quite similar. There is undoubtedly a duty for states to act against such activities, but 
where the threshold is not clarified by the statements directly related to acquiescence in 
the General Assembly resolution. E.g. it is not clear whether the duty relates to the aim, 
i.e. that all such preparatory activities ought to be prevented, or to the measures taken.  
 
The Declaration of Measures to Eliminate Terrorism (1994) also expresses that all states 
are “urged to” take inter alia 
 
“appropriate practical measures to ensure that their respective territories are not used for 
terrorist installations or training camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts 
intended to be committed against other States or their citizens”110 (italics supplied). 
 
The statement comes subsequent to the statement on acquiescence, so it seems as a 
relevant context for interpretation of acquiescence based on this declaration. However 
the weight of the statement is somewhat less: States are merely “urged to” take such 
measures, and not required to do so because it is a duty. Furthermore, the statement is 
not formally linked to use of force and the UN Charter Art 2 (4). But it is hard to see 
why there should be different approaches to acquiescence, dependent on whether it 
constitutes use of force or other violations of international law. 
 
The cited passage of the Declaration of Measure to Eliminate Terrorism (1994) focuses 
on the measures to be taken, which should be “appropriate” and “practical”, and this 
supports the view that acquiescence relates to the measures, not the aim of the duty as 
such. On the other hand, the means should “ensure” that no preparatory conduct 
happens, and this may be viewed as supporting the approach focusing on the aim. But 
the term “ensure” also contains certain flexibility, so it is not a clear argument in this 
respect. Furthermore, if the intention were to express a duty to effectively prevent all 
such activities, the statement could have focused merely on the aim. But it does not. The 
                                                 
110 No. 5, litra a. 
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Declaration of Measures to Eliminate Terrorism (1994) therefore supports the view that 
the duty to refrain from acquiescence implicates a duty to take certain measures, and not 
to effectively prevent all such activities by non-state actors on their territory. 
 
As regards the purpose of acquiescence, the interests of any state threatened or injured 
by such non-state actor conduct imply that the aim of the duty should be the relevant 
standard. The interests of the hosting state obviously support the approach emphasising 
the measures. The latter argument can be further supported by asking whether any state 
at all could secure that there are no organised activities on its territory directed towards 
terrorist acts abroad. It is questionable whether states would accept should an extensive 
duty and hence also questionable whether the approach focusing on the aim is reflected 
by the state practice expressed by the General Assembly resolutions of 1970 and 1994.  
 
Since acquiescence is covered by Art 2 (4), the purpose of this provision may provide 
guidance as well: To ensure it remains the main rule governing force the prohibition of 
use of force should not be interpreted too narrowly, in contrast to the assumption of 
Art 51 and self-defence. In that respect, the approach focusing on the aim of the duty to 
prevent could secure a better main rule. But a too broad interpretation could also 
undermine the respect for Art 2 (4), and the threshold of the prohibition should not be 
too low either.  
 
With some doubts attached, the duty to refrain from acquiescence implicates a duty to 
prevent by establishing a standard for which measures ought to be taken in relation to 
organised activities by non-state actors on its territory, and not in relation the aim as 
such. However it is not clear which measures ought to be taken to avoid a violation of 
the UN Charter Art 2 (4), i.e. when the measures are inter alia “appropriate” and 
“practical”. Such a discretionary consideration depends as well on the circumstances of 
each case.  
 
In relation to Afghanistan, the lack of any measures at all to prevent the conduct of 
Al Qaida on its territory is an argument in favour of acquiescence. Such a consideration 
would be much more difficult in relation to states that actually have taken some 
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measures. With respect to Afghanistan, the problem further is whether other factors are 
relevant to the question of acquiescence by that state. 
3.3.3.1.2.2 Knowledge 
Knowledge by the state was discussed by the ICJ in the Tehran case, with regard to a 
duty to prevent certain conduct: Militants had seizured the embassy of the United States 
in Iran, and the Iranian government had failed to take any required “appropriate steps” 
to protect the embassy or to prevent or stop the attack thereon, as required by the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961).111 Furthermore, the Iranian state knew 
about “the urgent need for action”, and this was emphasised by the ICJ when 
concluding that Iran had violated its international duties.112 It is however not clear 
whether the ICJ considered knowledge as a condition of violation or merely as a factor 
to the consideration.  
 
The legal basis to apply knowledge is not clear, since there is not explicit analysis by 
the ICJ e.g. to establish relevance of such a factor or condition according to customary 
international law. However the Tehran case seems to be consistent with the earlier 
Corfu Channel case on this point. The background were mines on Albanian territory 
causing damage on two British ships and their crew, and the question was whether 
Albanian violated an international duty to notify and warn ships passing its territory.113 
Albania had been inactive to prevent such consequences, and the ICJ emphasised that 
Albanian “knew, or ought to have known” of the laying of the mines when concluding 
that there was a violation of international law.114  
 
The problem is whether knowledge therefore is relevant to establish acquiescence by 
Afghanistan in violation of the UN Charter Art 2 (4). In particular the Tehran case is 
interesting: Truly there is a difference in the sense that the violent conduct happened on 
the territory of the state, whereas acquiescence relates to conduct directed towards 
violent incidents abroad. More important is however that both situations relate to a duty 
                                                 
111 The Tehran case, p. 31, para. 63. 
112 Ibid., p. 33, para. 68.  
113 Compare the Corfu Channel case p. 22. 
114 Ibid., p. 18, compare p. 22.  
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to prevent conduct by non-state actor on its territory. It is hard to see why knowledge 
should be irrelevant in relation to acquiescence in relation to the prohibition of use of 
force.  
 
Certain support is also found in a duty to prevent in international criminal law, namely 
in relation to the crime of failure “to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent” certain acts in accordance with e.g. the ICTY statutes Art 7 (3), where 
knowledge is a condition to establish the crime. The relevance of the argument is 
however limited: Truly there are some similar considerations on the prevention of acts 
being committed. But the focus of international criminal law is the responsibility of 
individuals, and not the responsibility of state. It is far from given that these rules ought 
to be designed identically. So it seems doubtful whether international criminal law gives 
much support to the relevance of knowledge in relation to acquiescence and Art 2 (4). 
 
There are several problems attached to the content of the relevant knowledge, or more 
precisely when the state “knew, or ought to have known” of the non-state actor conduct 
on its territory. Problems that will be pursued here are which threshold is proscribed by 
the term “ought to have known”, when the knowledge should be acquired, and who 
should have the knowledge. 
 
The term “ought to have known” envisages a discretionary consideration. Which factors 
are relevant to the consideration is not elaborated by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case, 
but some possible factors are pointed out: One factor may be to which extent the state 
has searched for information on the unwanted conduct by non-state actors, since it could 
undermine the duty to refrain from acquiescence if the state merely could argue that no 
knowledge was acquired, whereas no real search for information had been done. 
Important is that a state search for information in a solid and accurate way and the 
choice of methods for search is less significant. However it may help if national 
intelligence units are used in search for information on such conduct by non-state 
actors. Information may also be revealed e.g. through by investigations by the police, 
and it is important that such information is systematically analysed. But the state has 
probably a quite wide discretion to consider which extent of information search is 
necessary. Moreover, in relation to “ought to have known”, no state would have any 
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obligation to use methods of information search in violation of international 
humanitarian law or international human rights the state is bound by. In addition, the 
extent of the non-state actor operations is important; the more activity, the more likely 
the state ought to know of that conduct. 
 
It seems reasonable that the state has a certain period of time to react from it “knew, or 
ought to have known” of the conduct by the non-state actors, so that the state has a 
factual possibility to take appropriate measures against that conduct before it can 
acquiesce in it. To the considerations it may be that the higher gravity of the threat 
against other states, the less time is allowed for preparations of appropriate measures to 
be taken. In particular this may be so, where a state is not only threatened, but already 
injured. In contrast, it is possible that the more complex measures that are required, e.g. 
due to the extent of the operations by the non-state actor, the more time is allowed. 
 
Which persons are relevant to have such knowledge is neither clear. A possible answer 
is that it is sufficient that persons acting on behalf of the state, de jure or de facto, either 
“knew, or ought to have known” of the conduct by the non-state actor. The legal basis 
of such an approach is partly analysed in chapter 2. 
 
In relation to Afghanistan, it seems quite clear that the Taleban “knew, or ought to have 
known” of the conduct of Al Qaida on its territory, directed towards violent incidents 
abroad. The existence of the Security Council resolutions on Afghanistan excludes as 
such the opposite conclusion. Hence this knowledge constitutes another argument in 
favour of acquiescence by Afghanistan in violation of the UN Charter Art 2 (4).  
3.3.3.1.2.3 Ability 
In the Tehran case, also the ability of the state to act was a factor to the consideration of 
violation of a duty to prevent. The ICJ emphasised inter alia that the failure to act by 
the Iranian state was “due to more then … mere lack of appropriate means”.115 As with 
knowledge discussed above the ICJ does not state whether ability is a condition of 
violation or merely a factor to the consideration. 
                                                 
115 The Tehran case, p. 31, para. 63.  
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Another similarity is that the application of ability is not based on the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), outlining the duty to prevent, and there is 
no explicit analysis by the ICJ on the legal basis of ability to the consideration of 
violation of that duty. And in contrast to knowledge, there is no support of ability by the 
Corfu Channel case. But the fact that the ICJ considers such a factor or condition 
relevant in relation to the duty based on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
(1961) is in itself a strong argument. Since there are clear similarities to the duty to 
refrain from acquiescence covered by the UN Charter Art 2 (4), ability as outlined in the 
Tehran case also ought to be relevant in this context. 
 
Some support can be deduced from international criminal law also in relation to ability. 
In its jurisprudence relevant for the ICTY statutes Art 7 (3) the ICTY has applied a 
doctrine of “effective control”, requiring that the perpetrators ought to have the ability 
to prevent such acts. But the support is limited due to the differences described in the 
preceding section. 
 
With respect to Afghanistan the problem firstly arising is whether the Taleban had the 
appropriate measures at disposal so the state could comply with its international duty to 
refrain from acquiescence. As described above it is not clear which measures are inter 
alia “appropriate” and “practical”, and the same difficulty is attached to whether the 
state has the capacity to take such measures. For the purpose of ability, a possible 
interpretation is measures that can probably prevent and stop the conduct of the non-
state actor directed against violent incidents abroad. 
 
It is far from clear that the Taleban had such ability. Differently, the picture was clear in 
the Tehran case: The failure by the Iranian state to act sharply contrasted previous 
occasions of a similar character, where the government had taken the appropriate means 
to prevent and stop the conduct.116 Such previous action has not been carried out by the 
Taleban, at least not in relation to similar conduct to the trainings and other activities by 
Al Qaida. Truly the Taleban had approximately 90 percent of the territory of 
                                                 
116 Ibid., p. 31, para 64. 
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Afghanistan under control, and functioned as the state de facto, including by taking law 
enforcement actions. But Al Qaida seems to have had a considerable capability to act, 
also militarily, so it is far from given that the Taleban would have succeeded, had it 
tried to act against the organisation. A likely assumption is therefore that the Taleban 
did not have the appropriate means at its disposal to comply with the duty to refrain 
from acquiescence according to the UN Charter Art 2 (4). As a starting point, this 
constitutes an argument against acquiescence by Afghanistan.  
 
The problem further is whether any related factors weaken this ability argument. 
Although complete ability was lacking, the regime of Afghanistan could undoubtedly 
have taken some measures against the Taleban. But the Taleban did not. The problem 
therefore arises whether the ability argument is weakened. 
 
No answer is found in the Tehran case: The ability of the Iranian state truly implicated 
the consideration, but it is not clear that lack of such would have lead to the opposite 
conclusion by the ICJ. 
 
For the potential hosting state such an approach may cause problems: For Afghanistan, 
attempts to prevent the conduct of Al Qaida could have led the Taleban into a dangerous 
conflict with a non-state actor with considerable capabilities, with a risk of decreasing 
its general control of the territory. On the other hand, one option for the Taleban was to 
take some less significant measures against Al Qaida, with an important message to 
other states, signalling the will to do something against the non-state actor. Such action 
could have included taking explicitly distance to the intentions of Al Qaida. In this light, 
the lack of any measures at all indicates lack of will by the Taleban to comply with its 
international duties.  
 
But to accept acquiescence in face of partial ability by a state may undermine ability as 
a factor to the consideration. And it may also be difficult to establish any threshold on 
ability at all, so that there may even be difficult to draw any distinction to states that are 
completely failed or collapsed. This problem should however not be exaggerated, since 
the threshold may be low for states with partial ability to avoid acquiescence. Moreover, 
even some measures could have an effect on non-state actors, and hence also a positive 
  
 51 
 
effect for threatened or injured states, which is important in relation to the purpose of 
acquiescence as well. 
 
All in all, the total inaction by the Taleban indicates lack of will to perform its 
international obligations, due to more than mere lack of appropriate means in 
accordance with the Tehran case. The argument weakens the implication of lack of 
ability to act and constitutes an argument in favour of acquiescence in violation of the 
UN Charter Art 2 (4).  
 
Another problem is whether the ability argument is challenged if the hosting state 
receives any offer for help by other states. The duty to refrain from acquiescence aims at 
protecting other states. Lack of ability by a state can be important for the possibilities 
for a non-state actor to prepare terror acts abroad, and a denial of an offer for help from 
injured or threatened states can contribute to maintain this unwanted conduct. That is 
against the spirit of the duty to prevent. 
 
The interest of the hosting state contrasts the argument: Help from other states will in 
this respect typically involve military support, and the presence of foreign military 
forces may be a controversial issue. A state can as well have several motives for not 
wanting such presence, in particular where there is lack of trust between the involved 
states.  
 
Whose interests ought to prevail is a delicate issue in relation to such requests for help. 
But the situation is clearer where the conduct of the non-state actor leads to actual 
violent incidents abroad equivalent to an armed attack, such as the 11 September 
incident. Where the activities of the non-state actor continue in the aftermath of such an 
incident, a refusal of an offer for help by the injured state should be an argument in 
favour of acquiescence by the hosting state.  
 
In relation to Afghanistan it is maybe not fully clear that no offers for help were 
presented, but it does not seems that any such direct offers were presented. 
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3.3.3.1.2.4 The Causal Element 
Till now the discussion on acquiescence has related to the role of Afghanistan in 
relation to Al Qaida conduct on its territory. The problem is here whether there is any 
sufficient link between this preparatory conduct and the violent incidents abroad, in 
particular the 11 September incident. More precisely, the question is whether the 
conduct of Al Qaida in Afghanistan was “directed towards” such incidents abroad, as 
required of the duty to refrain from acquiescence according to the Declaration of 
Friendly Relations (1970).  
 
The term “directed towards” implies a causal element between the conduct of the non-
state actor on the territory and violent incidents abroad. Its ordinary meaning is not 
specific on e.g. the impact required of that conduct compared to other factors 
implicating the violent incidents, but as a starting point the term does not seem to 
establish any considerably high threshold.  
 
But in relation to the very idea of acquiescence it is fundamental that there is a certain 
casual element between the hosting state and the incidents by the non-state actor in the 
injured state. Otherwise it is meaningless to apply such a notion. And also a certain 
level should be required to establish the causal element, and a possible interpretation is 
that there ought to be a clear connection between the non-state actor conduct in the 
hosting state and the violent incidents abroad.  
 
In the comparable rule of international criminal law it is required that the lack of 
interference has a “direct and substantial effect” on the conduct that was not prevented, 
based on the ICTY statutes Art 7 (1). Although the relevance of the argument is limited, 
it slightly supports that there need to be a clear connection. 
 
In relation to Afghanistan, the territorial basis of Al Qaida in Afghanistan was clearly 
important for the capabilities of the organisation. The activities by Al Qaida in 
Afghanistan included extensive trainings and probably various forms of support, 
including co-ordination, directions, intelligence, finances and logistics. It seems 
therefore clear that these activities were “directed towards” violent incidents abroad, 
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such as the 11 September incidents. This again is an argument in favour of acquiescence 
by Afghanistan in violation of the UN Charter Art 2 (4). 
3.3.3.1.2.5 Proof 
Some problems are mentioned in relation to the process to establish acquiescence: 
Problems are attached to proof, i.e. which standard is required and which state has the 
burden of proof, the hosting state or the threatened or injured states.117 Furthermore, 
there are problems connected to whether there ought to be any process giving the 
possibly acquiescing state a possibility to present its view, which time should be used 
on the process and who should decide.  
3.3.3.1.2.6 Conclusions 
The Taleban acquiesced in the conduct by Al Qaida on its territory, directed towards 
violent incidents abroad such as the 11 September incident, and Afghanistan therefore 
violated its duty pursuant to the UN Charter Art 2 (4).  
 
Legally there are doubts attached to the basis of the duty, being based on inter alia 
General Assembly resolutions, although they seem close to state practice in the field. As 
regards the content, in particular the partial lack of ability by Afghanistan to act against 
Al Qaida constitutes a possible argument against acquiescence, even though the absence 
of any measures at all contrasts that argument.  
3.3.3.1.3 Security Council Resolutions on Afghanistan 
The doubts expressed on the basis of the duty to refrain from acquiescence are not 
relevant for Afghanistan: There exist particular duties introduced by various resolutions 
of the Security Council.118 Among other binding demands the Security Council has 
                                                 
117 Compare Scheideman (2000).  
118 Cf. in particular Security Council resolutions 1189 (1998), 1214 (1998), 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). 
The two latter resolutions are explicitly adopted under the Charter Chapter VII, whereas also the 
resolution 1214 (1998) contains binding demands, e.g. in its operative part, para. 13.  
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required that the Taleban “stops providing sanctuary and training for international 
terrorists and their organizations”119 and that it takes  
 
“appropriate effective measures … to ensure that the territory … is not used for terrorist 
installations and camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts against other 
States or their citizens”.120 
 
Although the duty is not formally expressed as acquiescence, its essence is equivalent to 
the duty to refrain from acquiescence based on the UN Charter Art 2 (4). So it is fair to 
assume that the point of departure is similar as described above (duty to prevent, 
section 3.3.3.1.2.1), and that the factors of knowledge and ability, in addition to the 
causal element, ought to be applied in the same way as discussed above. 
 
Hence the conclusion based on the Security Council resolutions is also that Afghanistan 
violated its international duties.  
3.3.3.2 Purpose of Self-Defence 
Previously, in section 3.1.1, it has been established that Art 51 must be a clearly limited 
and not broadly construed, in light of the prohibition of use of force, and that there 
hence are problem by accepting any state support as armed attack. Some examples 
thereof will here be given concretely related to acquiescence, based on the UN Charter 
Art 2 (4) as presented above. 
 
Truly there is quite a high threshold in some respects: To qualify as acquiescence the 
lack of interference by the state must be causally linked not only to the activities by the 
non-state actor on its territory, but also to the actual violent incidents abroad, such as the 
11 September incident. Having said that there are problems to limit the legal content of 
acquiescence: It is not fully clear whether the duty relates to the measures or the aim of 
the duty, and it is neither clear whether knowledge and ability are conditions or merely 
                                                 
119 Security Council resolution 1214 (1998), operative part, para. 13. Cf. also the resolutions 1267 (1999), 
operative part, para. 1 and 1333 (2000), operative part, para. 1. 
120 Security Council resolution 1267 (1999), operative part, para. 1. Cf. also resolution 1333 (2000), 
operative part, para. 1.  
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factors to the consideration. Also problems are attached to the implication of partial 
ability by a state and to which causal link are required between the non-state actor and 
the violent incidents abroad.  
 
Furthermore, there are problems attached to the process to establish acquiescence. In 
relation to proof, it may be difficult for the state claiming self-defence to prove that the 
alleged acquiescing state had the ability necessary to carry out it duty to refrain from 
acquiescence. On the other hand, mere allegations that nothing is done by the other state 
is not enough. Neither the standard nor burden of proof is clear in this respect. 
Furthermore, there are severe problems attached to the process establishing 
acquiescence. These problems are new compared to the “traditional” situation of self-
defence, where an armed attack is carried out by the armed forces of a state, without 
creating such difficult questions of evaluation. Since the answers to the problems are far 
from clear, armed attack in face of acquiescence contains a potential abuse for the 
injured state.  
 
In another, but related context there are some solutions to the problems of establishing 
acquiescence. Several antiterror conventions contain procedures where a state either 
must prosecute or extradite alleged perpetrators of terrorist acts. It is doubtful however 
whether these procedures are relevant for self-defence. Truly it is argued that the limits 
between self-defence and criminal law, in light of inter alia the antiterror conventions, 
would be blurred by accepting armed attack in relation to non-state actor conduct,121 e.g. 
in relation to acquiescence. But these conventions may remain ineffective if a state 
acquiesces in the conduct leading to terrorist acts abroad. Even if a state were to act in 
accordance with these conventions, self-defence is still another field of law and would 
remain unaffected by any potential overlap by the antiterror conventions. 
                                                 
121 Compare e.g. Cassese (2001). 
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3.3.4 State Practice and the Security Council 
State practice is undoubtedly a relevant source of interpretation of the UN Charter 
Art 51 in compliance with the Vienna Convention Art 31 (3) (b). And the factual 
importance of state practice is strengthened by the lack of clarity by Art 51 on the 
question of acquiescence and armed attack.  
 
In relation to most of the state practice presented in the following there exist resolutions 
by the Security Council. The approach will therefore be to analyse the implication on 
the interpretation of Art 51 by interplay of state practice and Security Council 
resolutions. 
3.3.4.1 Israel 
In its practice Israel has repeatedly referred to the right of self-defence in the aftermath 
of violent incidents in Israel allegedly carried out by the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO). A clear example thereof is the Israeli use of force against bases of 
the PLO in Lebanon 1982.122  
 
The problem is to identify any official Israeli arguments linked to the fact that a non-
state actor is claimed to carry out an armed attack, or any possible argument of 
acquiescence by Lebanon in this respect, since the arguments have been restricted in 
general to the existence of an “armed attack” pursuant to Art 51. In legal theory it has 
been emphasised in this respect that the failure of Lebanon to prevent the activities by 
the PLO on its territory constitutes a violation of the in international duties by Lebanon 
to refrain from acquiescence,123 but of course this does not provide guidance to the 
official view of Israel. 
 
In its practice, the Security Council has condemned several of the actions in alleged 
self-defence by Israel as e.g. a “reprisals” or as “disproportionate”.124 However there are 
no arguments linked to the non-state actor element, nor any possible acquiescence. The 
                                                 
122 Dinstein (2001, p. 218), with further reference to Feinstein (1985). 
123 Feinstein (1985, pp. 395-396, cf. pp. 370-381).  
124 O’Brien (1990, pp. 436-437). 
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problem is whether the lack of critics on this point constitutes a tacit consent in e.g. 
acquiescence as armed attack. If the Security Council did not agree with this aspect, it 
would have been clearer if the condemnation also related thereto. On the other hand, the 
Security Council may have had other reasons for omitting such criticism, and one 
possible reason is that its members may have found other parts of the self-defence 
argument more urgent to criticise, such as the alleged reprisal element and the lack of 
proportionality. Moreover, the argument of “armed attack” has never been accepted by 
the Security Council in this context. 
 
As outlined in chapter 1 (section 1.2.1.4), such Security Council resolutions have 
impact on the interpretation of the UN Charter Art 51 as such. Furthermore, they may 
have an influence on state practice as a particular appeal for states disagreeing with the 
view of the Security Council. Due caution is required in this respect, but in the actual 
examples there are numerous resolutions over a long period time, and these factors 
alone implicate strength of the resolutions in relation to state practice. 
 
The lack of specificity by the resolutions on non-state actors and acquiescence implies 
that the resolutions are no clear argument against armed attack in such situations. 
Having said that, they do not support such an approach either. And the lack of 
acceptance of “armed attack” in any of the relevant Israeli cases indicates that the 
resolutions are closer to rejection than acceptance of such an approach. The conclusion 
therefore remains that there is no clear solution on the question of acquiescence and 
armed attack pursuant to the UN Charter Art 51 based on the Israeli practice in light of 
the relevant Security Council resolutions. 
3.3.4.2 South Africa 
Also South Africa has applied such a self-defence argument to legally justify its armed 
action against bases of the African National Congress (ANC) abroad in the aftermath of 
violent incidents in South Africa. A similar problem arises, as in relation to the Israeli 
practice: There is no specificity on the question of acquiescence and non-state actors in 
relation to the condition of “armed attack”, neither by South Africa, nor by the Security 
Council in its resolutions. Therefore the conclusion remains equivalent to the 
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conclusion presented in relation to the Israeli practice above. Due to this feature the 
facts and arguments linked to South Africa are not further explored.125  
3.3.4.3 The United States: Afghanistan and Sudan 1998 
The armed action by the United States in Afghanistan and Sudan 1998 contains some 
similarities to the 2001 operation. American embassies in Kenya (Nairobi) and Tanzania 
(Dar-es-Salaam) had been bombed August 1998, resulting in the killings of more than 
200 people and injuries of several other people, in addition to material damages. 
Suspects were members of Al Qaida network. In relation to subsequent bombings of 
training bases of Al Qaida in Afghanistan, and of an alleged chemical factory in Sudan 
(Khartoum), the United States applied a self-defence argument.  
 
There is a clear similarity to the self-defence argument by Israel and South Africa. 
Nevertheless, the Security Council did not condemn the armed action in any resolution. 
Neither were any proposals for resolution rejected by the veto of the United States. The 
problem is therefore whether this lack of condemnation by the Security Council 
constitutes an attitude to the self-defence argument in contrast to its previous view. This 
is far from given, and neither in relation to Israel have all relevant armed action been 
condemned by the Council. It is therefore doubtful whether the lack of condemnation 
constitutes any tacit consent, accepting armed attack in face of acquiescence.  
3.3.4.4 The United States: Afghanistan 2001 
7 October 2001 the armed operation in Afghanistan started by the United States in 
proclaimed self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter Art 51.126 As arguments of 
interpreting Art 51, the strength of Security Council resolutions and state practice will 
be analysed respectively below. The relevance for acquiescence and armed attack is a 
separate point for discussion, and finally some comments related to jus cogens are 
presented. 
                                                 
125 For details, cf. e.g. Kwakwa (1987).  
126 The United States were supported by several states acting in allegedly collective self-defence. Any 
possible, particular problems on collective self-defence will not be discussed in the thesis.  
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3.3.4.4.1 Security Council Resolutions 
7 October 2001 the armed operation in Afghanistan started by the United States in 
proclaimed self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter Art 51. Already before 
7 October the Security Council reached two resolutions of interest for the matter, and 
their implication for the interpretation of Art 51 as such will be the first problem topic 
for discussion. 
 
12 September 2001 the Security Council condemned the 11 September incident as an 
act of terror in its resolution 1368 (2001) and referred to the right of self-defence in the 
pre-amble: 
 
“Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the 
Charter.” 
 
Although the resolution is not binding, it ought to have emphasis to the interpretation of 
Art 51 by virtue of expressing the view of the important treaty body for international 
peace and security (compare section 1.2.1.4). But the reference ought to be analysed 
with due caution. Decided upon the day after the incident, there was still far from clear 
e.g. which state element, if any, there was in the act. The feeling of an urgent need for 
action, combined with high political focus on the 11 September incident and problems 
arising there from, may have led to a too quickly produced text. 
 
Nevertheless, the wording ought to be the clear point of departure not only in treaty 
interpretation following the principles of the Vienna Convention, but also for the 
interpretation of Security Council resolutions. Although the reference could have been 
even clearer, explicitly connected the 11 September incident, it can hardly be 
understood in another way than that, to the opinion of the Security Council, there was 
an “armed attack” 11 September 2001 pursuant to the UN Charter Art 51.  
 
Some of the uncertainty above is reduced by Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), 
since the Council here reiterated the reference to self-defence in its previous resolution. 
The resolution contains binding provisions for all member states to introduce measures 
against the financing of terrorism. This binding effect strengthens the impact of the 
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resolutions on the interpretation of Art 51, although the reference to self-defence itself is 
contained in the non-binding pre-amble.  
 
These authoritative statements by the Security Council constitute forceful arguments for 
the interpretation of Art 51, although some caution is required for their application. 
Moreover, they contain possible argument of state practice, which will be addressed in 
the section below. 
3.3.4.4.2 State Practice 
Several statement were expressed by other intergovernmental organisations as well  The 
North Atlantic Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) stated 
12 September 2001 that the 11 September incident 
 
“if it … was directed from abroad … shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty, which States that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all” (italics supplied).127  
 
The statement was supported by parliamentary leaders of the 19 NATO countries 
14 September,128 and these statements of support were further confirmed one day after 
the start of the military operation in Afghanistan.129  
 
Similar statements were expressed by the European Union (EU), e.g. by heads of 
government 19 October 2001.130 The Organisation of American States (OAS) invoked 
the Rio Treaty Art 3 on 21 September 2001, resolving that the events of 11 September 
“are attacks against all American states”, recalling the right of self-defence.131 As well, 
the Australian Prime Minister stated “that the collective security provision of Article IV 
                                                 
127 Statement by the North Atlantic Council (12 September 2001).  
128 United States Government Report: A Chronology (20 December 2001). 
129 Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson (8 October 2001). 
130 United States Government Report: A Chronology (20 December 2001). 
131 Decision by the OEA (21 September 2001). 
  
 61 
 
applied to the terrorist attacks on the United States” as regards the Security Treaty 
Between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (ANZUS).132  
 
These statements are not only expressed by treaty organs of the respective 
organisations, but also by representatives of the member states as well and constitute 
arguments for the practice of these states. Due caution may be needed, but quite clearly 
most Western countries, through these statements, expressed their support to the United 
States by viewing the 11 September incident as an armed attack pursuant to the UN 
Charter Art 51. Some other states must be included in this group as well: The United 
States claims it “received 46 multilateral declarations of support from organizations”133. 
As well all members of the Security Council at the time ought to be included in the 
group.  
 
All in all, numerous states considered there was an armed attack 11 September 2001. 
The group includes powerful states of the world, and not only the number of states but 
also their power may be a relevant factor to consider the impact of state practice.134  
 
The view of some states contrasts the above, but only a few states explicitly denied any 
armed attack 11 September 2001.135 These statements reduce somewhat the strength of 
the state practice argument, but are not the real problem of the discussion. 
 
The difficult problem is the role of the lack of protests from the states that neither 
explicitly supported nor protested against the claim of armed attack against the United 
States. The question is whether such lack of protests constitutes acquiescence in the 
statements made by states and intergovernmental organisations in the aftermath of the 
                                                 
132 United States Government Report: A Chronology (20 December 2001). 
133 United States Government Report on Terrorism (19 December 2001). 
134 Compare Shaw (1997, pp. 62 and 63) and Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins in the Advisory Opinion 
on Nuclear Weapons, p. 2. 
135 These states include Iran, Iraq, Syria and Sudan, whereas less clear protests were expressed by Cuba 
and North Korea (cf. New York Times on the web and BBC on the web).  
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11 September incident.136 In general, the motives for lack of protests can be numerous 
and are not necessarily legally founded. And clearly the point of departure is that 
consent requires action by the state, not that action is required to avoid tacit consent in 
forms of acquiescence. Moreover, the rules governing force are fundamental for the 
legal order of international peace and security, and it may open for abuse to interpret 
lack of protests as support for a certain interpretation of self-defence, being the only 
clear exception137 for unilateral force. 
 
On the other hand, the fundamental body for international peace and security according 
to the UN Charter expressed its support to the perception of an “armed attack” 
11 September 2001. If member states of the United Nations, which includes practically 
all states of the world, were disagreeing with the Security Council, protests could be 
called for to prevent a certain development international law in terms of treaty 
interpretation. This argument is strengthened by the fact that not only a few, but quite a 
number of states, including powerful such, supported this view. 
 
In total it seems justified to view the lack of protests as acquiescence, with the Security 
Council resolutions being a significant argument.  
 
Therefore there is almost a full generality on the state practice in the aftermath of 
11 September 2001, constituting an argument of the incident that date being an “armed 
attack” pursuant to the UN Charter Art 51.  
 
Having said that, the state practice has obviously not been consistent over time yet. But 
state practice can be a forceful argument although its duration in time is limited.138 In 
relation to customary international law, rules regarding air space were considered 
established following the first space rocket launching 1958.139 Another example of so-
                                                 
136 Compare Brownlie (1998 p. 6), who states, as regards the discussion on the generality of custom, that 
“the real problem is to detect the value of abstention of protests by a substantial number of states in face 
of a practice followed by some others”.  
137 Compare Commentary to the Charter (2002, p. 789). 
138 Brownlie (1998, p. 5). 
139 Ibid. 
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called “instant custom” is the formation of the customary rules of economical zones of 
200 miles in the 1970s preceding the entry into force of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (1982).140 As regards the custom and air space, there is a 
significant difference to the present discussion: The establishment of such rules did not 
inflict with existing rules protecting other states. Whereas the establishment of 
economical zones reduced the right of state in relation to the respective coast states, 
those rights can hardly be characterised as vital as the right under issue, namely the right 
not to be object for unilateral use of force by other states except in self-defence. 
 
These examples have been compared to the use of force by NATO in Kosovo 1999, 
based on an independent exception from Art 2 (4) as humanitarian intervention. The 
argument has been that, compared to the examples above, that more should be required 
to establish a new exception for unilateral force, since it could affect much more 
seriously the existing rights of other states.141 The argument contains interest for self-
defence, since a widened scope could seriously affect other states in a similar manner. 
On the other hand, the question of interpretation of a clearly established exception to the 
prohibition of use of force differs from the establishment of a new exception, and a 
somewhat widened interpretation in light of state practice is another issue. Even such an 
approach were valid for self-defence, the conclusion could be different then the Kosovo 
intervention: Whereas states in general were reluctant to accept the legality of this 
intervention, even among the states who participated in the operation,142 the general 
attitude is considerably different in relation to the armed operation in Afghanistan and 
the 11 September incident as an armed attack. 
 
All in all, the lack of consistency over time somewhat decreases the weight of state 
practice as a source of interpretation of Art 51. But it is not decisive. The almost full 
generality of the state practice constitutes a strong argument that the 11 September 
incident was an “armed attack” as required for self-defence pursuant to the UN Charter 
Art 51.  
                                                 
140 Ibid. 
141 Cassese (1999, pp. 796-797). 
142 Ibid., p. 797, compare 792-793. 
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3.3.4.4.3 Relevance for Acquiescence 
The question remains whether the state practice implies that acquiescence is the relevant 
factor to establish the armed attack 11 September 2001. The attitude of the state acting 
in alleged self-defence may be a point of departure for the interpretation of state practice 
in this respect. In a letter 7 October 2001, the United States notified the President of the 
Security Council on its exercise of self-defence and referred to the “decision of the 
Taliban regime to allow” the conduct of Al Qaida on its territory. A “decision … to 
allow” does not necessarily imply acquiescence. On the contrary, a natural 
understanding is that it constitutes an avowed consent, which is to be distinguished from 
acquiescence.143 Having said that, the term used by the United States does not by any 
means exclude the option that acquiescence is viewed relevant to establish the armed 
attack.  
 
Further guidance may be provided by the response by the President of the Security 
Council 8 October 2001, where he expressed that the members of the Council were 
“appreciative” of the presentation by the United States and the United Kingdom.144 The 
President does not refer to any “decision” by the Taleban, but merely characterises the 
regime as “those who harboured” Al Qaida organisation. In its resolutions on 
Afghanistan the later years, the Security Council focused on the “shelter” or “harbour” 
provided by the Taleban, in other words the violation by the Taleban of its duty to 
prevent the activities of Al Qaida. Hence it seems that the President of the Security 
Council refers to acquiescence, and not any avowed consent by the Taleban. 
 
The letter by the United Kingdom to the President of the Security Council 7 October 
2001 is consistent with such an assumption, since it refers to support by the Taleban to 
Al Qaida. 
 
Nevertheless there are clear problems by interpreting the referred statements, since none 
of them explicitly deals with the concept of armed attack in relation to non-state actor 
                                                 
143 Compare Black’s Law Dictionary (1990), who states that acquiescence “is to be distinguished from 
avowed consent …”. 
144 Press Statement by the Security Council President (8 October 2001). 
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conduct and acquiescence. This illustrates a general problem by interpreting state 
practice, since there is often some lack of specificity on the concrete content of 
requirements considered fulfilled. However this does not mean that conclusion can not, 
or should not be drawn on the implication of acquiescence to an armed attack 
11 September 2001. It means however that such a conclusion is not clearly supported by 
the state practice.  
3.3.4.4.4 Jus Cogens  
Finally a problem is whether this state practice argument must be ignored in light of a 
jus cogens argument, more precisely whether the concept of jus cogens hinders the 
development of self-defence in the described direction. The problem presupposes that 
self-defence is jus cogens, which is far from given.145 Firstly the general construction of 
peremptory norms of international law must be accepted; the prevailing view in legal 
theory is that such a construction exists. The prohibition of use of force between states 
constitutes a clear example of a norm of jus cogens character, at least as regards the core 
of the prohibition.  
 
Since a widening of the scope of an exception inflicts the scope of the main rule, the 
argument is that self-defence as exception also ought to be a peremptory norm. And 
self-defence needs to be interpreted in the context of other rules governing use of force. 
But it is required that almost all states agree on the character of jus cogens. And 
whereas this seems quite clear in relation to Art 2 (4), it is hardly commented upon in 
relation to self-defence, so it is difficult to argue in favour of such an agreement in 
relation to self-defence. 
 
For the sake of the argument, self-defence as jus cogens would arise the problem of 
whether state practice must be e.g. more consistent and general to have an impact on the 
interpretation of Art 51, widening its scope. A peremptory norm of international law can 
only be changed according to the process proscribed by the Vienna Convention Art 53, 
and it is not clear that any such process has happened with self-defence and the role of 
acquiescence in the condition of armed attack. But it is not clear that there is any change 
                                                 
145 Dinstein (2001, pp. 164-165). 
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of self-defence. More likely is that it relates to a change of interpretation. And it is not 
dramatically compared to the wording. It will be a change compared to earlier state 
practice and Security Council resolutions, but even these are not clear in the field.  
 
So it seems doubtful that the jus cogens argument affects the conclusion as regards state 
practice above. 
3.3.5 Conclusions 
There was an armed attack against the United States 11 September 2001, in face of the 
acquiescence by Afghanistan in the conduct of Al Qaida on its territory. Decisive has 
been the strength of state practice in the aftermath of the 11 September incident, 
coupled with the Security Council resolutions on the matter. In addition, support is 
deduced from the Definition of Aggression (1974) and its term “substantial 
involvement”, as referred to the in the Nicaragua case. A possible counterargument is 
found in previous state practice, as highlighted by Israel, and the reactions from the 
Security Council, but it is not clear whether it relates to armed attack and acquiescence.  
 
But the state practice and Security Council resolutions in the aftermath of 11 September 
2001 are neither specific on the role of acquiescence and non-state actor conduct in 
relation to armed attack. However the assumption presented in the thesis is that 
acquiescence is a possible and feasible approach to analyse that aspect of armed attack. 
  
 67 
 
4 Conclusions 
The events of 11 September 2001 constituted an “armed attack” pursuant to the right of 
self-defence contained by the UN Charter Art 51. Decisive for the conclusion is the 
acquiescence by the Taleban in the conduct by Al Qaida on its territory, which was 
directed towards violent incidents abroad. 
 
The approach has been to analyse who can carry out an armed attack, and under which 
circumstances, with Afghanistan as the important focus, and a distinction has been 
drawn between conduct by a state and conduct from a state. State conduct may 
undoubtedly be an armed attack, and the question in chapter 2 was whether there was 
such state conduct. The threshold following from the customary rules of state 
responsibility is quite high, and based on these rules there was no conduct on behalf of 
Afghanistan 11 September 2001.  
 
Conduct from a state, in combination with state support, was analysed in chapter 3, and 
a distinction was made between active and passive support to non-state actors. It is not 
clear whether any active support is an armed attack pursuant to Art 51, although e.g. 
financial support is not covered. If active support may be included by “armed attack”, 
the threshold should be high. However there was clearly no armed attack on that basis 
in relation to the 11 September incident, since no active support was identified from the 
Taleban to Al Qaida. But the passive support of the Taleban, acquiescing in the conduct 
of Al Qaida on its territory, was sufficient to establish an armed attack 11 September 
2001.  
 
The strengths and weaknesses of the interpretations given of the UN Charter Art 51 and 
its term “armed attack” need particular comments: As regards the question of state 
conduct in chapter 2, it relies on a quite firm legal basis, through the customary rules of 
state responsibility. The view of the ILC in its Report (2001) should not be taken for 
granted as customary international law, but on the important parts of the analysis the 
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assumptions by the ILC are confirmed by judgements in particular by the ICJ, in the 
Nicaragua case and the Tehran case. This does not mean that the picture is clear, since 
inter alia the criticism expressed by the ICTY in the Tadic case of the requirement of 
“effective control” contains certain weight. 
 
The purpose of Art 51 and armed attack formed the point of departure for chapter 3, 
concluding that an armed attack should not be accepted in situations of state support 
short of making the non-state actor a state agent. This assumption deserves emphasis 
but should not be exaggerated since aspects of that purpose also provides argument in 
favour of armed attack in some situations of state support.  
 
Furthermore, two General Assembly resolutions were applied, namely the Definition of 
Aggression (1974) (substantial involvement) and the Declaration of Friendly Relations 
(1970) (use of force). The essential argument in relation to both resolutions was that 
they neither open nor close the door for state support being armed attack. The value of 
these resolutions as legal arguments of treaty interpretation relies first and foremost as 
possible reflections of state practice, since in particular the resolutions are approved by 
all the member states of the United Nations. But the application of such resolutions 
remains somewhat controversial, and all due caution has been required in the discussion 
of them. 
 
Passive support was analysed more in depth, being particularly interesting in relation to 
Afghanistan: As regards the violation of the duty to prevent it must be emphasised that 
the legal basis was not only the Declaration of Friendly Relations (1970), in relation to 
the UN Charter Art 2 (4), but also binding Security Council resolutions on Afghanistan. 
Legal doubts are however attached to the content of acquiescence, both in relation to the 
factors of knowledge and ability, based on the views by the ICJ in the Tehran case and 
the Corfu Channel case. With respect to the relevance of acquiescence for armed attack, 
state practice in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 was emphasised: It is quite 
extensive, although the implication of lack of protests by a vast number of states is 
controversial, even in light of the statements by the Security Council in the pre-amble of 
the resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001). And it is yet to whether this line of state 
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practice will be confirmed in relation to other incidents similar to the 11 September 
incident.  
 
There are in total doubts attached to the conclusions, but the arguments of accepting an 
armed attack 11 September 2001 in face of the acquiescence by Afghanistan seem 
convincing.  
 
A reservation to the conclusions in relation to Afghanistan must be taken to the factual 
basis: Some relevant information has been hardly available, so the conclusion must be 
viewed in light of this fact. 
 
The question remains whether analogies can be called for in other situations where 
states acquiescence in non-state actor conduct directed towards violent incidents abroad. 
State practice in relation to the specific incident 11 September 2001 was decisive for the 
conclusion in relation to Afghanistan, and acceptance of armed attack in such a situation 
has not occurred in newer state practice before that incident. It is therefore far from 
clear that other similar incidents in the future will automatically be covered by armed 
attack without any further confirmation by states in their practice.  
 
Attention must also be drawn to other aspects of self-defence, both in relation to the 
11 September incident and other similar incidents. Firstly the extent of the armed attack 
must be sufficient, and the acts must be directed against a state. These aspects of armed 
attack were not controversial in relation to the 11 September incident. Therefore the 
state practice in the aftermath contains hardly any acceptance of the argument that 
several violent incidents can be accumulated to an armed attack, which is an important 
part of e.g. the Israeli self-defence argument. 
 
Moreover, the customary self-defence requirement of proportionality and necessity must 
be completed: Proportionality implies inter alia the question of whether it is legal to 
militarily target the regime of a supporting state, such as the Taleban, or only the non-
state actor in the self-defence operation. There is also a problem, in relation to necessity, 
of whether a military response is an illegal reprisal, and not a self-defence action. 
Necessity also indicates that use of force is the last resort, and also in the “war against 
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terror” other means must be considered or tried, such as diplomatic, economical or 
judicial means. 146  
 
There are legal challenges indeed in the aftermath of the 11 September incident. 
Self-defence is a category for use of force that is easily put under pressure, containing 
the only clear legal basis for unilateral force. Self-defence also ought to be a realistic 
category, reflecting the needs of defence of states. Although the 11 September incident 
was an armed attack, careful considerations must be done to establish whether similar 
incidents may be covered by Art 51. Particularly it will be important which view will be 
expressed by states in their practice on this problem. In that sense the legal situation is 
clearer, but not considerably clearer, than it was before 11 September 2001. 
                                                 
146 Compare Cassese (1989, pp. 604-608). 
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